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COMMENT
Constitutional Law: Beyond the Bounds of Roe: Does
Stenberg v. Carhart Invalidate the Partial-Birth Abortion
Ban Act of 2003?*
I. Introduction
Almost immediately after President George W. Bush signed the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 2003 (PBABA)' on November 5, 2003, the storm of
rhetoric began. Within hours of the signing, federal district courts issued
temporary restraining orders against Attorney General John Ashcroft and his
agents, ordering them not to enforce the PBABA.2 A spokesman for the
National Right to Life Committee commented that the temporary injunctions
would "impede the government's ability to protect these premature infants."3 On
the other side of the debate, an attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union
commented, "We're awfully glad to be able to protect women all over the
country against this dangerous, inappropriate intrusion by the government into
their private, medical decision."4
As the cases questioning the constitutionality of the PBABA make their way
to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Act's challengers attack the statute on a variety
of grounds. First, the challengers focus on the PBABA's failure to exempt by
name the most common late-term abortion procedure, commonly called D&E,
or even mention the terminology preferred by both those performing abortions
* The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official
policy or position of the U.S. Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. The
author would like to thank Professor Michael Scaperlanda, Professor Joe Thai, Professor Mary
Margaret Penrose, Natalie McNeal, Virginia Hodges, and his "editor-in-chief"/wonderful wife
Jamie. The author would also like to dedicate this article to his daughter Madison. She
provides a personal reminder that life, even only thirty-one weeks after conception, is beautiful,
valuable, and worthy of protection.
1. Pub. L. No. 108-105, 117 Stat. 1201 (sections 1 & 2 not codified; section 3 codified
at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531(a) (West Supp. 2004)).
2. Associated Press, Gov't Promises to Defend New Abortion Law, FOX NEWS CHANNEL
(Nov. 7, 2003), available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,102395,00.html. Planned
Parenthood announced plans to challenge the PBABA as early as March of 2003: "'Planned
Parenthood will file suit as soon as the bill is signed,' its president, Gloria Feldt, said in an
interview. 'I mean that minute."' Robin Toner, As Abortion Battle Escalates, Both Sides Look
to the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2003, at A19.
3. Associated Press, supra note 2.
4. Id.
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and the Court.5 Second, the challengers accuse Congress of attempting to
circumvent the Supreme Court's holding in Stenberg v. Carhart6 - which
struck down a state statute that attempted to prohibit the same procedure - or
otherwise exceeding their congressional authority.7 Finally, many challenging
the PBABA highlight the absence of an exception for a woman's health.' The
Carhart majority focused on this "flaw" in reviewing the Nebraska statute that
was ultimately declared unconstitutional.9 In Carhart, the Court arguably
established a broad health exception requirement surpassing the one
contemplated in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.'0
If read broadly, the Carhart precedent creates an insurmountable obstacle for
those desiring to regulate abortion in any meaningful manner."
The Supreme Court should dispense with these periphery challenges to
confront the central questions presented by the PBABA: (1) whether carefully
prohibiting access to one procedure, which is not widely accepted in the medical
community, imposes an undue burden on a woman's constitutional right to
access abortion; and (2) whether the Carhart health exception requirement is so
expansive that it applies even when no arguable benefit to a woman's health
exists. This comment contends that the Court should recognize Congress's
effort to draft a constitutional piece of legislation and decline to simply dismiss
the PBABA as contrary to Carhart. Further, this comment argues that the
Supreme Court should uphold the PBABA and balance the interests of women
seeking abortions against the governmental interest in prenatal life in a manner
that gives meaning to both.'2 If necessary, the Court should simultaneously limit
5. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914,939 (2000); id. at 951 (O'Connor, J., concurring);
Melissa C. Holsinger, Note, The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003: The Congressional
Reaction to Stenberg v. Carhart, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 603, 608-09 (2002).
6. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
7. See Holsinger, supra note 5, at 609; see also Joanna S. Liebman, Note, The Underage,
the "Unborn, "and the Unconstitutional: An Analysis of the Child Custody Protection Act, 11
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 407, 418-20 (2002) (arguing that Congress lacks the authority to
regulate any abortion issues).
8. See, e.g., Gail Glidewell, Note, "Partial Birth" Abortion and the Health Exception:
Protecting Maternal Health or Risking Abortion on Demand?, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1089,
1135 (2001); see also Holsinger, supra note 5, at 614.
9. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 930-39.
10. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
11. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 1012 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Court also focused on whether
the definition of partial-birth abortion was too vague. Id. at 938-39. As this comment will
address, the PBABA should render that argument moot.
12. The Court has clearly recognized that states have an interest in fetal life. Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992) (finding intervening abortion cases
"inconsistent with Roe's statement that the State has a legitimate interest in promoting the life
or potential life of the unborn"). This comment argues that Congress may appropriately invoke
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the health exception's scope to an objective test that only considers
demonstrable health risks and benefits, and does not defer to the opinions of
individual physicians participating in the economic enterprise of abortion.
Part II of this comment discusses the medical aspects of partial-birth abortion,
the background of the PBABA, and the Supreme Court's reasoning in Carhart.
Part II further analyzes the PBABA and its potential constitutional defects.
Specifically, Part I1/ addresses concerns over the PBABA's terminology,
protests over its lack of a health exception, and objections to Congress
regulating partial-birth abortion. Part IV lays out a recommended framework for
how the Supreme Court should review a constitutional challenge to the PBABA.
First, Part IV argues that the PBABA can survive application of the holdings in
Carhart. Second, Part IV contends that, if necessary, the Court should apply
certain aspects of Carhart narrowly - particularly its expansive application of
the health exception requirement. In conclusion, Part V summarizes the
arguments necessary for the Court to affirm the PBABA.
II. Background of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003
A. What Is Partial-Birth Abortion?13
To understand the effect of the PBABA, it is important to have an
understanding of the medical aspects of partial-birth abortion. Dr. James
McMahon is generally credited with developing partial-birth abortion, and he
labeled his procedure "intact dilation and evacuation." 4 The procedure first
gained notoriety, however, when Dr. Martin Haskell presented a lecture on what
he called the dilation and extraction (D&X) abortion procedure at a National
Abortion Federation seminar in 1992." According to Dr. Haskell's thorough
explanation, physicians perform a partial-birth abortion by first grasping a lower
fetal extremity with an instrument. 6 He explained that he was able to find a leg
that interest. See infra Part IlI.B.
13. This comment will primarily refer to the procedure targeted by this legislation as partial-
birth abortion, unless more specific terminology is required. See infra Part It.A. 1. There are
two reasons for this comment's language choice, despite the fact that the majority in Carhart
prefers the terms dilation and extraction (D&X) and intact dilation and evacuation (D&E),
apparently on an interchangeable basis. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 927. First, the subject federal
legislation, as well as the legislation that was the subject of Carhart, uses the term partial-birth
abortion. Second, the term has several policy implications discussed infra Part lIl.A. 1.
14. Douglas Johnson, Call It "Partial-Birth Abortion" - It's the Law!, NAT'L RIGHT TO
LIFE NEWS, June 16, 1997, at 1-3.
15. Martin Haskell, Second Trimester D&X, 20 Weeks and Beyond, SECOND TRIMESTER
ABORTION: FROM EVERY ANGLE: FALL RISK MGMT. SEMINAR 27-34 (Nat'l Abortion Fed'n
1992), available at http://www.house.gov/burton/RSC/haskellinstructional.pdf.
16. Id. at 30.
2004]
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by watching the fetal movement on a sonogram. 17 After pulling one leg out of
the mother, the doctors perform the abortions by using their fingers to pull the
rest of the body outside of the mother except for the head.'8
While Dr. Haskell noted that "[u]sually there is not enough dilation for [the
head] to pass through," 9 the question remained about what would happen to an
infant who is fully born during the procedure. Congress, in considering this
question, found that fully delivered infants marked for abortion were often left
to die slowly, whether as a result of undeveloped lungs or by starvation.2°
Consequently, it passed the Born-Alive Infants Protection Act of 2002 to
reestablish that fully born infants gamer the full protection of the law and
deserve the full protection of the medical community.2 The reality of needing
to prohibit clear infanticide provides insight into the arguments supporting the
legality of partial-birth abortion discussed throughout this comment. As this
discussion of the medical aspects of partial-birth abortion shows, the physical
reality of the procedure closely resembles infanticide in that a majority of the
fetal body exits the mother's body before death.
After pulling most of the body out of the mother, Dr. Haskell recommended
that physicians wrap their fingers around the partially delivered infant's
shoulders. 22 While pulling on the tiny body, the physicians pierce the partially
delivered infant's skull with an instrument.23 Dr. Haskell suggested a pair of
blunt, curved Metzenbaum scissors, while other doctors utilize a hollow metal
tube known as a trochar. 24 After piercing the skull, the physician inserts a
suction catheter into the hole, which sucks out the fetal brain.25 This process
causes the skull to collapse, allowing complete removal of the body.26
A distinct procedure from partial-birth abortion, dilation and evacuation
(D&E) is the most common procedure for late-term abortions. 27 According to
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Born-Alive Infants Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-207, 116 Stat. 926.
"Princeton University Bioethicist Peter Singer argues that parents should have the option to kill
disabled or unhealthy newborn babies... and I quote him: 'A period of 28 days after birth
might be allowed before an infant is accepted as having the same right to live as others."' 146
CONG. REC. H8154 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2000) (statement of Rep. Canady).
21. Born-Alive Infants Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 107-207, 116 Stat. 926.
22. Haskell, supra note 15, at 30.
23. Id. at 30-31.
24. Id. at 30; Johnson, supra note 14, at 2.
25. Haskell, supra note 15, at 31.
26. Id.
27. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 924 (2000). "Late-term" is an admittedly vague
term, but one the Court and others addressing the issue often use. It inarguably excludes all
first-trimester abortions, and includes all third-trimester abortions. The gray area is exactly how
[Vol. 57:601
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol57/iss3/5
COMMENT
Dr. Haskell, physicians usually execute a D&E abortion by dismembering the
fetus while it remains inside the uterus and then removing the pieces after
completing the dismemberment.28 On the other hand, Dr. Leroy Carhart, the
plaintiff in Carhart, testified that he normally accomplished dismemberment by
actually pulling the limbs of the fetus outside of the woman and utilizing the
traction that the cervix provides on the rest of the fetal body to effectuate the
dismemberment.29 Nevertheless, there is a clear difference between either form
of D&E and partial-birth abortion, where almost the entire living fetus is
removed and then killed by a separate act.
The primary concern Dr. Haskell cited for developing an alternative
procedure to D&E was the difficulty of dismembering fetuses at later stages of
fetal development when their tissue has become tougher.30 Accordingly, he
performed partial-birth abortions on nearly all of his patients who were between
twenty and twenty-four weeks pregnant with only limited exceptions." Dr.
Carhart claimed that the use of partial-birth abortion over D&E reduced the
danger of sharp fetal bone fragments damaging the cervix upon limb extraction,
minimized the number of times instruments must be inserted into the woman,
and decreased the likelihood of leaving fetal tissues in the uterus.32
B. Congressional Justifications for the PBABA
In passing the PBABA, Congress asserted that the significant health risks of
partial-birth abortion and the existence of safer alternatives combine to outweigh
any necessity for making the procedure available.3 3 Because it concluded that
much, if any, of the second trimester would qualify as late-term. See Partial-Birth Abortion Ban
Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2(14)(I), 117 Stat. 1201, 1205 (citing to a medical
association discussing partial-birth abortion after twenty weeks); Carhart, 530 U.S. at 959
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing late-term procedures after nineteen weeks); Haskell, supra
note 15, at 27 (detailing D&X as a procedure for use after twenty weeks); see also James Bopp,
Jr. & Curtis R. Cook, Partial-Birth Abortion: The Final Frontier of Abortion Jurisprudence,
14 IssuEs L. & MED. 3, 23 (1998) (discussing viability at twenty-three weeks). But see Carhart,
530 U.S. at 924-25 (discussing the performance of D&E procedures between thirteen and fifteen
weeks).
28. Haskell, supra note 15, at 28.
29. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 925.
30. Haskell, supra note 15, at 28. Later in the lecture, Dr. Haskell also listed quickness,
ability to perform the surgical outpatient method on a scheduled basis, and the necessity of only
local anesthesia as other advantages of the partial-birth abortion procedure. Id. at 33. These
were not listed as advantages over D&E, however, and the same advantages would seem to
apply to D&E.
31. Id. at 28.
32. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 928.
33. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2(4)-(5), 117 Stat.
1201, 1202.
20041
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the procedure is "never necessary to preserve the health of a woman," Congress
did not include an exception for the health of the woman within the Act's
prohibition.' While recognizing that the Supreme Court concluded differently
in Carhart, Congress distinguished its conclusion based on its own factual
findings.35 In fact, Congress suggested that had the Court not been bound in
Carhart to accept the trial court's findings, the Supreme Court may have agreed
that a health exception is superfluous.36 In addition, Congress claimed that even
though the Court had accepted distinctly different factual conclusions, the
Court's precedent permitted Congress to reach its own factual findings.37
According to the findings section of the PBABA, Congress compiled a
substantial record of evidence during the course of extensive hearings in the
104th, 105th, 107th, and 108th Congresses; thus, Congress considered its
judgment very informed.38 Based on the evidence gathered, Congress concluded
that no credible medical evidence showed that partial-birth abortions were ever
safer than alternative abortion procedures.39 In particular, Congress noted that
Dr. Carhart and Dr. Haskell could not identify any situation where it was
medically necessary for the woman's health to perform a partial-birth abortion
over an alternative abortion procedure.4° Congress combined these facts with
its determination that the procedure actually precipitated serious health risks and
concluded that a ban without a health exception would generally advance the
health interests of women seeking abortions.41
In addition to advancing women's health, Congress also recognized the
interests in drawing a bright line distinguishing abortion from infanticide,
34. Id. § 2(5), 117 Stat. at 1202. Congress directly adopted the quoted language from the
Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 921; Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973).
35. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act § 2(3), 117 Stat. at 1201.
36. Id. § 2(7), 117 Stat. at 1202.
37. Id. § 2(8), 117 Stat. at 1202.
38. Id. § 2(13), 117 Stat. at 1203-04.
39. Id. § 2(14)(B)-(C), 117 Stat. at 1204.
40. Id. § 2(14)(D)-(E), 117Stat. at 1204-05. Justice Thomas also referenced the admissions
of Haskell and Carhart in his Carhart dissent. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 1015 (2000)
(Thomas, J., dissenting). "However, plaintiffs have not demonstrated the existence of any
particular situation for these women for whom induction is contraindicated in which an intact
D & E would be a doctor's only option to preserve the life or health of a woman." Planned
Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 1002 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (emphasis
added).
41. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act § 2(14)(A), (F), 117 Stat. at 1204-05. "Those risks
include, among other things: An increase in a woman's risk of suffering from cervical
incompetence.... risk of uterine rupture, abruption, amniotic fluid embolus, and trauma to the
uterus[,] ... lacerations and secondary hemorrhaging[,] ... shock, and could ultimately result
in maternal death." Id. § 2(14)(A), 117 Stat. at 1204.
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preserving the medical profession's integrity, and encouraging respect for life.42
Indeed, the PBABA asserts that a heightened interest exists in the life of the
"partially-born child" because it is only inches away from being born and thus
becoming a person.43 The Act credits a prominent medical association for
recognizing that, once inside the birth canal, the fetus is living and autonomous
from the woman's body." The recognition of this autonomy calls into question
the validity of asserting a woman's right over her own body as justification for
abortion - the assertion at the heart of the argument for the right to abort.45
Based on this reasoning, Congress concluded that performing this questionable
procedure compromises the medical profession and tarnishes its reputation.
46
Congress also noted that the practical inability to distinguish partial-birth
abortion from infanticide promotes a total disregard for the lives of human
infants in general.47
C. The PBABA 's Prohibition on Partial-Birth Abortions
The preceding justifications and conclusions served as Congress's basis in
passing the PBABA, which seeks to prohibit the partial-birth abortion
procedure. Section 3 of the PBABA contains the actual prohibition that will be
imported into title 18 of the United States Code. Section 3 begins by tying the
prohibition on partial-birth abortions to Congress's Commerce Clause power.48
The PBABA next establishes a two-year imprisonment as the maximum
punishment for doctors who perform partial-birth abortions."9 The Act,
however, specifically immunizes the woman obtaining the abortion from any
form of prosecution.' ° In a ddition to the criminal punishment, the Act imposes
civil liability on the physician.5
The PBABA defines partial-birth abortion as follows:
the person performing the abortion (A) deliberately and intentionally
vaginally delivers a living fetus until, in the case of a head-first
42. Id. § 2(14)(G), 117 Stat. at 1205.
43. Id. § 2(14)(H), 117 Stat. at 1205.
44. Id. § 2(14)(I), 117 Stat. at 1205. While Congress simply refers to the organization as
"a prominent medical association," Justice Kennedy credits the amicus brief of the Association
of American Physicians and Surgeons for the same revelation. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 963
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
45. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act § 2(14)(I), 117 Stat. at 1205.
46. Id. § 2(14)(J)-(K), 117 Stat. at 1205.
47. Id. § 2(14)(L), 117 Stat. at 1206.
48. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531(a) (West Supp. 2004).
49. Id. On the other hand, the Nebraska statute in Carhart set the maximum punishment
at twenty years. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 922.
50. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531(a).
51. Id.
2004]
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presentation, the entire fetal head is outside the body of the mother,
or, in the case of breech presentation, any part of the fetal trunk past
the navel is outside the body of the mother, for the purpose of
performing an overt act that the person knows will kill the partially
delivered living fetus; and (B) performs the overt act, other than
completion of delivery, that kills the partially delivered living
fetus .... 52
The preceding language specifically defines how much of the body must be
outside of the woman's body to fall within the prohibition's scope. The
language also takes care to define the procedure in two discrete steps: (A) the
delivery of the body, and (B) the overt act of killing "the partially delivered
living fetus." 3
Some critics of the PBABA point out that the Act does not contain an
exception for the health of the woman.54 At least one journalist falsely stated
that the PBABA does not even provide an exception for a woman's life that
might be endangered by the prohibition of partial-birth abortions." Despite this
accusation, the PBABA does provide an exception for those cases in which the
inability to obtain a partial-birth abortion might endanger the life of the woman
seeking an abortion.56 In cases where any physical condition, including those
arising from the pregnancy itself, jeopardizes a woman's life, the prohibition
does not apply.57
52. Id. § 1531(b)(1).
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Glidewell, supra note 8, at 1135; see also Holsinger, supra note 5, at 614.
55. Martha Raddatz from ABC News asked, "And what are the chances in the courts,
particularly since this bill does not take into consideration the life of the mother?" Washington
Week (PBS/WETA television broadcast, Oct. 24,2003) (transcript available at http://www.pbs.
org/weta/washingtonweek/transcripts/transcript031024.html); see also NewsHour(PBSIWETA
television broadcast, Apr. 25, 2000) (transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/
newshour/bb/law/jan-june00/scotus_4-25a.html) (mischaracterizing the Nebraska partial-birth
abortion law as not having an exception for the life of the woman).
56. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531 (a) (exempting "a partial-birth abortion that is necessary to save the
life of a mother whose life is endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness, or physical
injury, including a life-endangering physical condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy
itself"). One might question how a procedure that can never benefit the health of the woman
could be used to save the life of the woman. A more consistent approach would have been for
Congress not to allow any exceptions because of its determination that the procedure offered
no possible health benefit. Of course the interest in life is mandated by the language of the
Fourteenth Amendment and would most likely be required. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
173 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
57. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531 (a). Considering the potentially broad definition of health discussed
infra Part IIl.A.2, there is an important distinction to be made between an exception when the
woman's life is in danger and an exception that allows for partial-birth abortions when only the
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D. Stenberg v. Carhart
The PBABA would not be the first ban on partial-birth abortions considered
by the Supreme Court. By 2000, more than thirty states had enacted some type
of prohibition against partial-birth abortions.18 Dr. Carhart brought an action
challenging the partial-birth abortion ban in Nebraska, one of the states in which
he performed the procedure.59 The Nebraska ban prohibited all partial-birth
abortions except when necessary to save a woman's life.' In Carhart, the
Supreme Court held that Nebraska's statute violated a woman's constitutional
right to access an abortion.6' The majority in Carhart found that the law
contained three main defects. For the purpose of later analyzing the
constitutionality of the PBABA, it is important to identify and understand these
defects perceived by the Court.
1. Nebraska Failed to Sufficiently Define the Procedure So As to Exclude
D&E
In Carhart, Nebraska conceded that if the partial-birth abortion legislation
applied to the D&E procedure, it would be unconstitutional under Casey's
undue burden analysis.62 In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,63 the Supreme
Court invalidated abortion legislation in part because it prohibited a very
common abortion procedure, thus forcing women to undergo more obscure and
perhaps more dangerous methods of abortion.64 The Nebraska statute defined
partial-birth abortion as a procedure in which a person "deliver[s] into the vagina
a living unborn child, or a substantial portion thereof, for the purpose of
performing a procedure that the person ... knows will kill the unborn child."'65
The Court in Carhart construed the statute's "delivery" and "substantial portion
of the child" language to encompass D&E, which sometimes involves pulling
a limb through the cervix and outside of the woman to dismember the fetus.'
Therefore, because the Court determined that the prohibition's scope included
woman's "health" is at risk.
58. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 979 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 922.
60. Id. at 921-22.
61. Id. at 920-21.
62. Id. at 938. This would be so because physicians performing second-term abortions
most commonly use the D&E procedure. See, e.g., id. at 951 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
63. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
64. Id. at 78-79. The Court invalidated a ban on one abortion method because it was
"designed to inhibit... the vast majority of abortions after the first 12 weeks." Id.
65. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 938 (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-326(9) (Michie Supp.
1999)).
66. Id. at 938-40.
60920041
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D&E, the ban was an unconstitutional undue burden on a woman's right to
choose.67
In dissent, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas all argued that, even if the
statute was ambiguous, the Court should uphold it under the reasonably
deferential standard of review normally applied to statutes.68 In most cases, the
Court reviews a statute according to its plain meaning and, if necessary, will
even interpret the statute narrowly to uphold it.69 Whereas the Nebraska law
sought to regulate partial-birth abortion by banning a killing act after substantial
delivery of the fetal body, the D&E procedure sometimes involves pulling
individual limbs into the birth canal.7" The Carhart dissenters disagreed with
the inclusion of fetal disarticulation within the definition of delivery.7' They
also objected to the majority's refusal to consider the statute as only prohibiting
those abortions where delivery is distinct from the killing process.72 The
dissenting Justices contended that a different conclusion about either definitional
issue clearly removed the D&E procedure from the statute's scope.73 Despite
these arguments, the majority held that the statute exposed doctors using the
D&E method to potential prosecution, and that such exposure placed an
unconstitutional undue burden on a woman's right to abort.74 Apparently
responding to the dissent's arguments decrying the Court's unforgiving
construction of the statute, the majority opined that the legislators should have
explicitly excluded D&E from the prohibition's scope.75
2. Nebraska Failed to Provide a Health Exception to the Ban on Partial-
Birth Abortion
In Carhart, the Court seemingly held that all legislation regulating or
proscribing abortion must contain an exception for the health of the mother.76
Nebraska made the argument that its partial-birth prohibition did not need a
health exception because the circumstances surrounding the procedure did not
require one.77 Specifically, the State argued that equally safe alternatives to the
procedure existed; therefore, the statute's prohibition posed no risk to a
67. Id.
68. Id. at 954, 973-74, 983 (Scalia, J., dissenting; Kennedy, J., dissenting; Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
69. Id. at 983 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 938 (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-326(9)).
71. Id. at 974-75, 990-91 (Kennedy, J., dissenting; Thomas, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 974-76, 990-92 (Kennedy, J., dissenting; Thomas, J., dissenting).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 945-46.
75. Id. at 939.
76. Id. at 921 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992)).
77. Id. at 931.
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woman's health.7 8 In fact, Nebraska argued that because the partial-birth
abortion procedure was more likely to harm a woman's health, the ban actually
produced an overall health benefit to women.79
The Supreme Court, however, ultimately rejected these arguments based on
the lower court's findings.80 Although the Court acknowledged that the State's
findings were well supported by expert medical opinion,8 1 it accepted the district
court's conclusion that, according to Dr. Carhart, the partial-birth abortion
procedure was safer than D&E for a small number of abortions that he
performed.82 The majority in Carhart conceded, however, that a division of
opinion existed among medical experts, as well as a lack of controlled medical
studies that definitively compared the relative safety of these two procedures.83
The Supreme Court concluded that the division among medical experts
actually weighed against the constitutionality of the statute because of the
Court's construction of the word "necessary."' In Roe v. Wade85 and Casey, the
Supreme Court held that a state may regulate or even proscribe abortion after
fetal viability unless the abortion "is necessary" to preserve a woman's life or
health.86 According to the Carhart majority's analysis, the belief that the partial-
birth abortion procedure possesses health advantages in some situations means
that the absence of a health exception places a woman at "an unnecessary risk
of tragic health consequences. 87 Carhart further implied that the State could
not reasonably object to including a health exception because, even if the State
was correct about the lack of medical necessity, no one would invoke the
exception. 88 Trusting the medical opinion of individual physicians who perform
abortions instead of the State's perspective on overall health benefits, the
majority opinion placed the burden squarely on the State and determined that
Nebraska fatally failed to show that an exception to the partial-birth abortion ban
78. Id.
79. Id. at 933-34.
80. Id. at 932.
81. Id. at 933-35.
82. Id. at 932.
83. Id. at 936-37.
84. Id. at 937.
85. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
86. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,879 (1992) (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-
65).
87. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 937.
88. Id.
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is "never necessary" for a woman's health.89
3. Nebraska's Asserted Interests in Proscribing Partial-Birth Abortion
Were Invalid
The majority in Carhart only cursorily examined the State's interests and, in
combination with the concurring opinions of Justices Stevens and Ginsburg,
seemed to summarily dismiss them.' After quoting the standard from Casey
and Roe - that states may proscribe or otherwise regulate abortion after fetal
viability to promote their "interest in the potentiality of human life"'" - the
Carhart majority quickly concluded that "of course" the Nebraska law did not
directly further an interest in the potentiality of human life because the statute
only regulated a particular method of abortion and did not attempt to save the
unborn life.92 The Court reached this conclusion despite Nebraska's clear
declaration that one of the law's purposes was to "show concern for the life of
the unborn."93 In dismissing these interests, the Carhart Court went beyond
rejecting Casey's promise to give more consideration and weight to state
interests' 4 by placing states in the unusual predicament of having to convince a
majority of the Court that their explicitly stated interest in unborn life is sincere.
Not only did the Carhart Court frustrate Nebraska's ability to express an
interest in fetal life, it also seemed to inhibit the State's ability to express other
valid interests. Likewise, the Court dismissed Nebraska's efforts to prevent
cruelty and uphold the medical profession's integrity.95 Indeed, Justice Kennedy
argued in dissent that, even if Nebraska's interests were not the interests listed
in Roe, they were valid and the Court should recognize them under Casey.96
Nevertheless, the Court seemed to consider any interest regulating abortion
invalid other than preventing abortion or protecting the mother's health.97
89. Id. at 932, 937-38. The Court made the statements that Nebraska must show that a
health exception is never necessary and that a split in judgment shows a need for a health
exception. In combination, these statements imply that there must be a unanimous opinion that
a health exception is not needed in order for one to be absent. Id. at 937.
90. Id. at 962 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
91. Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65).
92. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 930.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 961-62 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 960-62 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 930-31. Some scholars interpreted the resulting precedent to hold that the only
legitimate interest before viability is women's health, and after viability women's health is still
the controlling interest. Glidewell, supra note 8, at 1100-02. Contra Casey, 505 U.S. at 886
(States may, even before viability, "favor childbirth over abortion, even if those measures do
not further a health interest.").
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In their concurring opinion, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg stated even more
clearly the majority's implication that Nebraska's distinction between partial-
birth and any other abortion procedure is "irrational."98 Justice Stevens could
not even fathom a state having a legitimate interest in prohibiting any type of
abortion.99 According to Justice Stevens, the choice of what type of abortion
procedure to use should rest solely on the discretion of the doctor without any
state interference."° Hopefully, this view will remain a minority opinion among
the members of the Court for two reasons.
First, Justice Stevens's view seems like a distortion of the constitutional right
to abortion that was conferred to a woman, not her physician.'0 1 The second
reason requires. a bit of background. In a 2003 case decided by the Sixth Circuit,
Women's Medical Professional Corp. v. Taft,1°" opponents of a new Ohio ban
on partial-birth abortions expressed their preference for an abortion procedure
in which they could fully deliver a completely intact, living infant and then
destroy it.'°3 They argued that the process would involve no insertion of sharp
instrumentation into the woman and would not pose any of the D&E risks
identified by those who favor partial-birth abortion." In the Ohio case, the
discretion of the physicians, to which Justice Stevens gives much credibility,
allowed for clear infanticide. If taken to its extreme conclusion, Justice
Stevens's view might hold Congress's action prohibiting infanticide of
premature infants "marked for abortion" unconstitutional."°5
98. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 946-47 (Stevens, J., concurring).
99. Id. at 946 (Stevens, J., concurring).
100. Id. "[It is] impossible for me to understand how a State has any legitimate interest in
requiring a doctor to follow any procedure other than the one that he or she reasonably believes
will best protect the woman in her exercise of this constitutional liberty." Id. (emphasis added).
101. Justice Stevens's characterization of the state illegitimately burdening the discretion of
the doctor seems at odds with the normal characterization of the right to abortion. See BARBARA
MILBAUER & BERT N. OBRENTZ, THE LAW GIVETH: LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE ABORTION
CONTROVERSY 122 (1983) (arguing that abortion law inappropriately "yoked abortion to the
physician's acquiescence").
102. 353 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2003).
103. Id. at 450.
104. Id.
105. Born Alive Infants Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-207, 116 Stat. 926. Justice
Stevens is not alone in his views of extreme deference on matters of abortion, which seem to
permit postbirth infanticide. See 146 CONG. REC. H8154 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2000) (statement
of Rep. Canady). Peter Singer, who made the argument for killing young infants under certain
circumstances, is an extreme figure; however, there are more mainstream examples. General
Wesley Clark, who was a candidate for the 2004 Democratic presidential nomination, made the
comment in the heat of his election campaign that "life begins with the mother's decision." E-
mail from The Federalist, 04-02 Brief (Jan. 16, 2004). Clark's statement, if taken to its logical
extreme, would seem to condone a postbirth decision by a woman deciding that the life of her
newborn baby had not begun. Without clear distinctions and parameters for what the
2004]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2004
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
Similar to Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsburg could not perceive a valid state
interest in Carhart and insisted that Nebraska's ban on partial-birth abortions
could only be motivated by a desire to "chip away" at the abortion right
established in Roe. 1°6 She relied on Judge Posner's dissent in Hope Clinic v.
Ryan, 07 which argued that two state partial-birth prohibitions were solely the
vehicles "legislators have chosen for expressing their hostility" to abortion
rights, and that the only interest underlying the prohibition was the state's desire
"to make a statement of opposition to constitutional doctrine."108 The Carhart
majority seemed slightly more restrained than the concurring justices in its
reaction to the State's asserted interests, but still dismissed them as not being
genuine in their concern for unborn life." The Court reached this conclusion
despite Nebraska's explicit statements to the contrary. 0
Combined with prior precedent, the Court's standard for expressing an
interest in unborn life creates a Scylla and Charybdis dilemma. "' On one hand,
a statute that actually seeks to "save any fetus from destruction""'2 would almost
certainly be considered an undue burden and a de facto attempt to "strike at the
right [of abortion] itself,"'" 3 therefore clearly violating Casey. On the other
hand, the subtler attempt to express concern for unborn life by prohibiting the
extremely questionable partial-birth abortion procedure also fails to meet the
Court's demand for a legitimate interest. 114 After Carhart, the question remains
as to what avenues, if any, are left for states to express their interest in unborn
or potential life.
Constitution requires with regard to abortion jurisprudence, the possibility of infanticide is
really no longer just a slippery slope argument.
106. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 952 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
107. 195 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1999).
108. Id. at 881 (Posner, J., dissenting).
109. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 930.
110. Id. (stating Nebraska's declaration that one of the law's purposes was to "show concern
for the life of the unborn").
111. The Scylla and Charybdis have been defined as
a huge, dangerous rock on the coast of Italy, supposed to be the abode of the
mythical monster, Scylla, which seized and wrecked passing vessels. Just across
the narrow Straits of Messina, near Sicily, was a dangerous whirlpool, thought to
be the home of another monster, Charybdis; for a vessel to avoid one meant the
risk of falling into the clutches of the other.
WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1633 (Jean L. McKechnie ed., New
World Dictionaries 2d ed. 1983) (1955).
112. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 951 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
113. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992).
114. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 930-31; see also Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp.
2d 436, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (making a finding of fact that "D&X is a gruesome, brutal,
barbaric, and uncivilized medical procedure").
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Congress can only hope that when the Court addresses the PBABA, it will
take a far less dismissive view of Congress's findings and intent than it took of
the Nebraska legislature's in Carhart. While the preceding discussion of
Carhart may seem to show that no ban on partial-birth abortion can withstand
judicial review, several avenues for regulation still remain. As discussed in the
next section, the concurring opinion of Justice O'Connor plainly explained at
least one of these avenues." 5
III. Analysis of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003
A. Why Congress Did Not Follow Justice O'Connor's Tip
Although the Supreme Court struck down Nebraska's legislative prohibition
against partial-birth abortions, it did not completely foreclose the possibility of
any regulation of this procedure. Sometimes, a judge or justice who drafts a
concurring opinion in a judicial decision will inform the case's hapless losers
what they can do the next time to swing that jurist's vote to their side.
Especially with regard to a five-four vote, such recommendations can provide
valuable information to legislators hoping to pass constitutional muster the next
time around. Justice O'Connor seemingly provided such a tip in her Carhart
concurrence, explaining that "a ban on partial-birth abortion that only proscribed
the D&X method of abortion and that included an exception to preserve the life
and health of the mother would be constitutional in my view." 16 While the
PBABA's sponsors in Congress felt that they responded to these concerns in the
legislation," 7 they clearly did not take the course of action Justice O'Connor
intended for them to take. The following sections discuss Congress's decision,
along with its possible justifications.
1. What's in a Name?
The Carhart majority and Justice O'Connor's concurrence offered an
apparently simple solution to one of the flaws in the Nebraska law. Both
suggested that the statutory language define the partial-birth abortion procedure
by using the "medical" term D&X and by specifically excluding the D&E
115. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 951 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 951 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
117. 149 CONG. REC. S2522 (daily ed. Feb. 14,2003) (statement of Sen. Santorum); see also
Charles Lane, Courting O'Connor: Why the Chief Justice Isn't the Chief Justice, WASH. POST,
July 4, 2004 (Magazine), at Wl0. "'We were certainly cognizant of Justice O'Connor's
opinions,' particularly in the Nebraska case, says Rep. Steve Chabot (R-Ohio), the law's chief
sponsor in the House. 'We really carefully crafted the bill, trying to do all we could to withstand
a constitutional challenge."' Id.
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procedure by name." 8 Some jurists have concluded that legislators use partial-
birth abortion terminology as a way to arouse more public emotion and
subsequent support." 9 Despite such argument, however, Congress's decision
not to use the terminology recommended by Justice O'Connor is not a flaw of
constitutional magnitude. In fact, the term "partial-birth abortion" possesses
several legitimate advantages over any other term preferred by doctors who
perform these types of abortions.
First, as Justice Thomas pointed out in his Carhart dissent, partial-birth
abortion is actually a more descriptive term than D&X.' 20 For example, D&E
also involves the dilation of the cervix and the extraction of fetal parts; thus, the
law's enforcers could much more easily confuse D&E with D&X.' 21 On the
other hand, partial-birth abortion connotes something totally separate from
simply dilating the cervix and extracting fetal parts. In fact, Justice Thomas
contended that the accuracy and descriptiveness of the term might be what the
majority found so objectionable. 2 2 He further noted that the "term 'partial birth
abortion' may express a political or moral judgment," but this fact should not
invalidate legislation utilizing the term. 23  Justice Thomas analogized
Congress's use of the term partial-birth abortion with its use of the term "assault
weapon."' 24 While the National Rifle Association and firearm manufacturers
rejected the term "assault weapon," Congress established its use as a matter of
law, and the Court subsequently used and accepted this term.
25
Ironically, the second advantage of the PBABA terminology arises from a
close analysis of the Carhart decision. The majority assumed in the opinion that
the Nebraska law would prohibit D&X and force physicians to resort to D&E. 1
26
This conclusion somewhat contradicted the Court's holding that the statute was
unconstitutionally vague because it would apply to both partial-birth abortion
118. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 939; id. at 951 (O'Connor, I., concurring). But cf. Richmond
Med. Ctr. v. Hicks, 301 F. Supp. 2d 499, 515 (E.D. Va. 2004) (striking down a partial-birth
abortion statute even though it explicitly excepted D&E).
119. See Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Taft, 353 F.3d 436, 439 (6th Cir. 2003)
(commenting that "efforts by the parties and amici to fortify their arguments by the use of
labels... [were] obviously employed for revulsive or obfuscating effect").
120. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 1000 (Thomas, J., dissenting). To compare the legitimacy of the
terms D&X and partial-birth abortion, this comment will necessarily have to alternate between
the two terms in this section. Cf. supra note 13.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1001 n.16 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
124. Id.
125. Id.; Bopp & Cook, supra note 27, at 20.
126. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 932.
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and D&E 1 27 Another contradiction in the Carhart opinion occurred when the
majority adopted Dr. Carhart's practice of using the term "intact D&E" as a
synonym for partial-birth abortion or D&X.128 Obviously, then, statutory
language that simply states that the prohibition does not apply to D&E is
insufficient because a physician such as Dr. Carhart could continue using his
intact D&E procedure even though it is substantially the same procedure that the
legislature attempted to abolish. 129
Third, the terms "intact D&E" and "D&X" are both under and overinclusive
regarding the actual practice that the legislature seeks to ban.130 In the writings
that coined these abortion procedure terms, the authors also referred to
procedures that would clearly not fall within the legislation's scope, such as
extracting an already dead fetus."' On the opposite end of the spectrum, the
term D&X is underinclusive if the legislature relies on the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) definition of D&X referenced in
Carhart132 because a physician could avoid prosecution simply by performing
the partial-birth abortion on a fetus already in the breech position. 33 In fact,
because this definition seems to limit D&X to cases where suctioning the brain
out of the skull actually kills the partially born infant, it would cover almost no
partial-birth abortions because the fetus usually dies when its skull is
punctured. 134
127. Id. at 939.
128. Id. at 928 (explaining that "intact D&E and D&X are sufficiently similar for us to use
the terms interchangeably").
129. Id. at 1002 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v.
Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 972, 1000 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (equating D&E with partial-birth
abortion and using the term intact D&E for the latter).
130. See Bopp & Cook, supra note 27, at 21; Johnson, supra note 14, at 2-3.
131. Bopp & Cook, supra note 27, at 21; Johnson, supra note 14, at 2.
132. In 1997, the ACOG defined D&X as follows:
1. deliberate dilatation of the cervix, usually over a sequence of days; 2.
instrumental conversion of the fetus to a footling breech; 3. breech extraction of
the body excepting the head; and 4. partial evacuation of the intracranial contents
of a living fetus to effect vaginal delivery of a dead but otherwise intact fetus.
Carhart, 530 U.S. at 928 (quoting AM. COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS,
ABORTION POLICY 1 (Jan. 12, 1997) (on file with the Oklahoma Law Review)).
133. Id.; Bopp & Cook, supra note 27, at 21. The ACOG definition came about rather late
in the game, after both Congress and several states had attempted to regulate the procedure,
referring to it as partial-birth abortion.
134. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 928; Johnson, supra note 14, at 2-3.
2004]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2004
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
Finally, in addition to the legislatures of over half of the states and the U.S.
Congress,'35 many members of the medical profession, including the American
Medical Association (AMA), are quite comfortable with the term partial-birth
abortion. 136 The Merriam-Webster Medical Dictionary provides a definition for
the term "partial-birth abortion," while notably omitting any definition of
"dilation and extraction" or "intact dilation and evacuation."'' 37 In fact, some in
the medical profession feel that "partial-birth" is the only medically recognized
terminology for the procedure. 13' The Court should not give any weight to the
fact that those administering or supporting the legality of partial-birth abortion
prefer the use of euphemistic terminology. 139 Arguably, the term partial-birth
abortion conveys more information, is a more accurate term, and has a more
commonly understood application. Given that "there is no requirement that
Congress ... draft statutes using morally agnostic terminology,"'" the Court
should place no constitutional significance on the legislature's use of the term
partial-birth abortion.
2. Congressional Fear of the Health Exception
An examination of the history of the health exception must precede a
discussion of why Congress chose not to include one. The Supreme Court
stated in Roe, when creating the right to abortion, that the right is not absolute. "'
The Court held that states can regulate and even prohibit abortion after viability
"except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the
135. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 994 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that "the term 'partial birth
abortion' has been used in state legislation on 28 occasions and by Congress twice" before the
PBABA).
136. Bopp & Cook, supra note 27, at 21.
137. MERRIAM-WEBSTER MEDICAL DICTIONARY, at http://www.intelihealth.comlIH/ihtlHI
WSIHWOOO/9276/9276.html (last visited Aug. 21,2004) (defining partial birth abortion as "an
abortion in the second or third trimester of pregnancy in which the death of the fetus is induced
after it has passed partway through the birth canal").
138. NewsHour (PBS/WETA television broadcast, Nov. 5, 2003) (transcript available at
http://www.pbs.orglnewshourbbllaw/uly-dec03/abortion_11-05.html) (quoting Dr. Curtis
Cook's statement that "nobody less than the National Institutes of Health and the National
Library of Medicine both list . . .partial birth abortion and ... [exclude intact D&E and
D&X] .... [P]artial birth abortion is the only recognized medical term.").
139. Contra Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Taft, 353 F.3d 436,439 (6th Cir. 2003) ("[W]e
reject the efforts by the parties and amici to fortify their arguments by the use of
labels . . .obviously employed for revulsive or obfuscating effect."). The Sixth Circuit
apparently fails to realize that the procedure itself is revulsive, not the terminology used to
describe it.
140. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 1001 n.16 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
141. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973).
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preservation of the life or health of the mother."' 4 2 The provision ultimately
became known as the health exception requirement. When conjoined with the
term "life," the requirement seems like a reasonable protection of women and
balancing of the competing interests. The health exception, however, has
arguably taken on a meaning drastically different from what its linguistic
connection to the preservation of a woman's life originally implied. The
Carhart majority asserted in dicta that including a health exception, even when
evidence showed that the exception did not benefit a woman's health and was
not necessary, posed no negative consequences.'43 Thus, this section analyzes
possible negative consequences of including a health exception in a piece of
legislation proscribing a method of abortion.
Doe v. Bolton,14 the companion case to Roe, is sometimes relied upon for an
additional explication of the health exception requirement. 145 This reliance is
somewhat logical considering that Justice Blackmun, who authored the majority
opinions of both Roe and Doe, warned that the former must be read in light of
the latter." As shown below, however, the Court seemed to stray away from
the Roe standard and inappropriately applied Doe with regard to what abortion
regulations states could enact without running afoul of the health exception
requirement.
The majority in Doe upheld a Georgia requirement that doctors could only
legally perform abortions after they determined that it was necessary to preserve
the woman's life or health. 147 In upholding this restriction, the Court adopted the
district court's broad interpretation that, under the Georgia statute, "medical
judgment may be exercised in the light of all factors - physical, emotional,
psychological, familial, and the woman' s age- relevant to the well-being of the
patient.""' On its face, the Doe holding does not appear to demand that a state's
142. Id. at 165.
143. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 937.
144. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
145. See, e.g., Women's Med. Prof I Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 209 (6th Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1036 (1998) (Voinovich 1).
146. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165.
147. Doe, 410 U.S. at 191-92. Doe issued holdings on essentially three main issues. First, the
Court held that Georgia's abortion requirements of state residency for women seeking abortions,
accreditation for hospitals performing abortions, procedure approval by hospital staff, and
independent examinations by two other physicians unconstitutionally infringed on the right to
abortion. Id. at 193-200. Second, the Court rejected appellant's argument that Georgia's laws
violated the equal protection clause because it discriminated against the poor. Id. at 200-01.
Finally, the Court rejected appellant's argument that the requirement that abortions be performed
only when it is necessary in the judgment of the physician was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at
191-92. Instead, the Court found that this requirement was constitutional as interpreted to allow
a physician to consider all factors related to health. Id.
148. Id. at 192.
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regulation of abortion must consider the ultimate impact of all of these factors
on a woman's health.'4 9 Nevertheless, Doe has been interpreted to require a
broad and amorphous health exception for all abortion regulations. For
example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit felt bound by the
Supreme Court's precedent to find an Ohio ban on partial-birth abortions
unconstitutional because the health exception only accounted for physical health
conditions, but failed to consider mental or emotional health risks. 150 Over the
dissenting opinion of Justice Thomas - in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Scalia joined - the Court did not grant certiorari."5' Justice Thomas
argued that the Court's holding in Doe provides no support for a rule requiring
mental health exceptions.' 52 Nonetheless, the Court's unwillingness to review
the Sixth Circuit's decision leaves the impression that a majority of the Supreme
Court may apply such a rule.
In addition to the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of Doe, the Supreme Court has
also made statements reinforcing the idea that mental health may be ajudicially
required component of any health exception. The Casey plurality opinion of
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter stated that "psychological well-being"
was unquestionably a component of health.'53 In the pre-Casey decision of
Harris v. McRae,154 the Court referenced the psychological and physical aspects
of health just before opining that "it could be argued that the freedom of a
woman to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy for health reasons does in
fact lie at the core of the constitutional liberty identified in [Roe v.] Wade."'1
55
If the broad, overarching considerations listed in Doe constitute minimum
requirements, then an appropriate health exception, or the manner in which a
court will interpret and apply a health exception, will truly swallow any rule
prohibiting abortion.156  The mere burden of giving birth to a child can
profoundly impact the mother in regard to emotional and familial concerns,
especially if the mother or father does not want the child.'57 Therefore, potential
149. Id. at 183, 192; see Voinovich v. Women's Med. Prof 1 Corp., 523 U.S. 1036, 1039
(1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (Voinovich 11); see also Stephanie D. Schmutz, Note, Infanticide
or Civil Rights for Women: Did the Supreme Court Go Too Far in Stenberg v. Carhart?, 39
Hous. L. REv. 529, 548 (2002).
150. Voinovich 1, 130 F.3d at 209.
151. Voinovich II, 523 U.S. at 1036.
152. Id. at 1039.
153. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992).
154. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
155. Id. at 316.
156. ROBERT A. DESTRO, Abortion and the Constitution: The Need for a Life-Protective
Amendment, in PROPOSED CONSTrrUTIONAL AMENDMENTS ON ABORTION 708-09 (Proposed
Constitutional Amendments on Abortion, Series No. 46, app. 1976).
157. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW: AMERICAN
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parents who do not want their child can invoke an appropriately broad mental
health exception to any law that attempts to keep them from obtaining an
abortion. This interpretation of the health exception requirement nullifies Roe's
promise that postviability prohibitions can be constitutional.'58
While the preceding interpretation of Roe and Doe seems contradictory and
unsustainable, the fear that the Supreme Court and lower courts would apply a
health exception in this manner may have very well motivated Congress not to
include a health exception at all.'59 In debating the bill, U.S. Senators expressed
concern that doctors justified every one of the 182 partial-birth abortions
performed in Kansas based on mental health reasons."6  Congressional
opponents of the PBABA further precipitated objections to a health exception
by arguing that seeing the partially born infant intact constituted a health
advantage of partial-birth abortion.' 6 ' The argument relied on the assertion that
the ability to see the dead body speeds up the grieving process and provides
greater access to information regarding hereditary illnesses or anomalies. 62 No
prohibition of abortion can really stand if abortion legislation must provide an
exception for the impact felt merely by carrying through with delivery, or for
such justifications as wanting to see the aborted baby intact. Indeed, a warning
from the early days of abortion precedent seems to lurk on the horizon of a
health exception under these circumstances: "[s]uch a broad definition of health
should not survive... unless it is made absolutely clear that the practical effect
of such a definition is to establish abortion-on-demand for the full nine months
of pregnancy.... " 163
Justice Scalia identified another problem with Carhart's framing of the health
exception requirement when, in dissent, he noted that the exception "requires the
abortionist to assure himself that, in his expert medical judgment, this method
is, in the case at hand, marginally safer than others."' 64 In the arena of abortion,
the Court apparently often prefers deferring to physicians, whom they trust are
FAILURE, EUROPEAN CHAULENGES 88-90 (1987); ERNEST HEMINGWAY, Hills Like White
Elephants, in MEN WITHOUT WOMEN 73-74 (1927); CIC Scott A. Hodges, Note, Abortion in
America: Is Compromise Possible?, 10 U.S. AIR FORCE AcAD. J. OFL. STUDIEs 175, 176-77
(2000).
158. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973).
159. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 983 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
160. 149 CONG. REC. S3560, S3605 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 2003) (statement of Sen. DeWine).
161. 149 CONG. REC. S3383, S3386 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2003) (statement of Sen. Boxer).
A federal district court also adopted this argument. See Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v.
Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 1000 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
162. 149 CONG. REC. at S3386.
163. DESTRO, supra note 156, at 717.
164. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 953 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia goes on to ask, "[H]ow can one
prove the contrary beyond a reasonable doubt?" Id.
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"good," rather than deferring to legislatures. 165  This deference appears
unmitigated by the fact that those performing the abortions are the only
individuals involved who possess an economic incentive to go through with the
abortion and choose a process that they prefer, even if others find it morally
abhorrent or detrimental to the woman's health. In several other pre-Casey
abortion decisions, the Supreme Court implied that if a physician considered an
otherwise illegal abortion method to be safer than a legal alternative, the state
must allow the physician to use it.' 66 Casey, however, acknowledged that the
prior abortion case law insufficiently recognized the states' interests in fetal life
at all stages of development.1 67  Accordingly, Justice Thomas's dissent in
Carhart noted "only a slight exaggeration when this Court described, in 1976,
a right to abortion 'without interference from the State. '", 6
8
While Casey seemed to reject the type of abortion law that would require a
comparative health exception, Carhart clearly resurrected the requirement in
some form. 69 Requiring a comparative health exception based on the judgment
of individual doctors who perform abortions, however, can easily invalidate any
legislation prohibiting certain abortion procedures. 7 ° In the case of Dr. Carhart,
the partial-birth abortion procedure was the more appropriate procedure, in his
medical judgment, for every abortion he performed after fifteen weeks
gestational age, regardless of medical indications or findings of the U.S.
Congress or state legislatures to the contrary.'7 ' A health exception based on the
judgment of individual physicians would have allowed Dr. Carhart to continue
killing partially born infants in the partial-birth manner he preferred for every
pregnant woman who came to him.
Furthermore, this type of comparative health exception could even justify
nullifying Congress's prohibition on the killing of fully born infants.'72 As
previously mentioned, some physicians feel that postbirth destruction of the
infant bears health advantages over other traditional abortion methods. 173 In the
165. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197 (1973) ("[W]e trust that most physicians are
'good.').
166. See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,768-69
(1986); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 400 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 78-79 (1976).
167. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992); see also Carhart, 530 U.S.
at 960, 981 (Kennedy, J., dissenting; Thomas, J., dissenting).
168. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 980 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S. at 61).
169. Id. at 937-38; see supra Part I.D.2.
170. See, e.g., Aim'ee M. Gauthier, Stenberg v. Carhart: Have the States Lost Their Power
to Regulate Abortion?, 36 NEw ENG. L. REV. 625, 668 (2002).
171. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 972 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
172. Born Alive Infants Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-207, 116 Stat. 926.
173. Women's Med. Prof'! Corp. v. Taft, 353 F.3d 436, 450 (6th Cir. 2003) (physicians
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Born Alive Infants Protection Act of 2002, the Senate unanimously banned this
type of infanticide. 4 A view of the health exception that would justify judicial
nullification of the Born Alive Infants Protection Act seems illegitimate to say
the least.
The preceding discussion demonstrates two negative consequences and,
therefore, two policy justifications for excluding an unnecessary health
exception, despite the assertion in Carhart that including a health exception
could have no negative results.'75 First, a court may interpret a health exception
to provide an exemption for an illegal partial-birth abortion obtained by a
woman on the basis of an insignificant justification, such as the tax on her
mental health from providing childcare.'7 6 Second, a court may exempt a
physician from prosecution if the court determines that, in the physician's
independentj udgment, the illegal procedure provides marginal health benefits. '77
Such a determination could prevent prosecution even if it directly conflicts with
the legislature's findings or substantial medical authority on the subject.'
Therefore, Congress can reasonably argue for the necessity of excluding a health
exception from a ban on partial-birth abortions.
B. Other Potential PBABA Defects
Three other potential defects that the Supreme Court may find with the
PBABA warrant brief discussion. The first issue concerns whether Congress
can simply rely on its own contradictory factual conclusions and expect the
Supreme Court to defer to its findings. 79 The second problem area concerns
whether the Court will view the PBABA as an illegitimate end-run around
Carhart.'8° Third, the Court may question whether Congress has the
constitutional authority to regulate abortion in this manner.' 81 As the following
stating on record their preference for infanticide).
174. 148 CONG. REC. S7084 (daily ed. July 18, 2002); Born Alive Infants Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 107-207, 116 Stat. 926.
175. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 937.
176. Glidewell, supra note 8, at 1100; see Taft, 353 F.3d at 454-55 (Tarnow, J., dissenting);
see also Women's Med. Prof 1 Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 209 (6th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 523 U.S. 1036 (1998) (Voinovich 1).
177. See supra notes 164, 170 and accompanying text.
178. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 953-54 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see supra Part II.D.2.
179. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 1010 (N.D. Cal.
2004); see also Holsinger, supra note 5, at 609-10.
180. Holsinger, supra note 5, at 609-14.
181. Judge Guido Calabresi recently drew a comparison between the PBABA and the
Violence Against Women Act of 1994 - struck down in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (2000) - claiming that it was hypocritical to allow one and not the other. Guido Calabresi,
Federal and State Courts: Restoring a Workable Balance, Address at the James Madison
Lecture on Constitutional Law at New York University School of Law (Oct. 15, 2002), in 78
20041
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discussion shows, the Court should easily dispense with these periphery
challenges in favor of upholding the PBABA.
Congress acknowledged in its PBABA findings that the Supreme Court found
substantial medical authority suggesting that a partial-birth abortion may be
beneficial in some instances, but insisted that this conclusion relied on faulty
lower court fimdings.'82 Congress pointed to Katzenbach v. Morgan'83 and
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC'84 as examples of judicial deference
to congressional findings of fact. 85 Turner is particularly instructive because
the Court addressed a constitutional issue and determined that its "obligation to
exercise independent judgment when First Amendment rights are implicated is
not a license to reweigh the evidence de novo, or to replace Congress's factual
predictions with our own."' 86 Part of the Court's justification for deference
relied on the fact that Congress remains admittedly better equipped than courts
to gather and evaluate large amounts of data in a more comprehensive fashion.187
One scholar has argued, however, that the above analogies fail because the
congressional findings preceded the Court's review of those cases, whereas the
PBABA's findings followed the Court's acceptance of the contrary district court
findings.18 8 While the Court may therefore choose to defer in only a limited
fashion and not accept Congress's assertion that a health exception will never
benefit women, it should still uphold the PBABA by giving a narrower reading
of the health exception requirement.1
89
The Court may simply consider the PBABA as an affront to its role as
ultimate constitutional interpreter' 9° in the same manner that it recently
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1293, 1297 (2003). While people do not generally get paid to assault women,
they do, however, get paid to perform partial-birth abortions. Additionally, while women do
not travel between states to purchase an assault, they do travel between states to purchase
abortions. Furthermore, in the absence of the statute, the sale of partial-birth abortions would
be a perfectly legal economic transaction with the imposition of taxes and other characteristics
of interstate commerce. Thus, partial-birth abortion clearly constitutes interstate commerce
while assault does not.
182. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2(3-8), 117 Stat. 1201,
1201-02.
183. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
184. 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (TurnerI).
185. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act § 2(9), (11), 117 Stat. at 1202-03.
186. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 666.
187. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997) (Turner I).
188. Holsinger, supra note 5, at 611-12. Holsinger also argues that Katzenbach is not
applicable because the legislation did not address a Supreme Court ruling on a constitutional
right. Id.
189. See infra Part IV.B.
190. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). Some would argue that Congress has a role -
even an equal role - in constitutional interpretation. This comment, however, will leave that
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considered another federal statute in Dickerson v. United States.'19 Although
Congress did not directly capitulate to the Court's demands for a health
exception and the use of "medical" terminology, 92 it had legitimate reasons for
the statutory framework that it ultimately chose. 93 Whereas the federal statute
considered in Dickerson did not follow from any additional factual findings and
directly contravened Miranda v. Arizona,"94 Congress made an effort to satisfy
Carhart by making additional findings and further defining the banned
procedure. 95 The Court should subordinate any injured pride that it might
experience when faced with the approach Congress selected in the PBABA to
the greater good of answering a question of national controversy."9
Finally, in regard to the PBABA, the doctrinal question arises of whether the
federal government may invoke the interests that both Casey and Roe conferred
to states, namely an interest in fetal life and a woman's health. Congress
possesses a legitimate interest in regulating the interstate commerce of partial-
birth abortions that entitles it to advance other goals through regulation of that
industry.' 97 Clearly, the abortion industry consists of economic activity given
argument aside.
191. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
192. See supra Part ll.B.
193. See supra Part HI.A.
194. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
195. See supra Part Il.B; infra Part IV.A. In Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428
(2000), the Court finally overruled a congressional statute that was passed in direct reaction to
Miranda. The statute sought to reestablish a due process model for whether a custodial
interrogation was unconstitutional. Id. at 436-37. This action was in direct violation of the
Miranda holding, and would have effectively overruled it had it been enforced and allowed to
stand. Id. at 436.
196. As to the Court's pride, some have argued that its holding in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey was purely authoritarian:
Those who disapprove of the Court's "results" . . . but who, as all good and
virtuous citizens should, in the Court's view, "nevertheless struggle to accept it"
are to be commended and protected, because they have been "tested" and found
loyal to the Court. They have accepted what they believe is wrong "because they
respect the rule of law" - a concept the Court finds identical with its own
decisions .... The Court in Casey wants us to know just how important it is to
love Big Brother.
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 995, 1037 (2003); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 996 (1992)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (commenting on this Nietzschean vision of an "Imperial Judiciary"). As
to the national controversy surrounding the PBABA, there is a supermajority that favors its
underlying rationale. See Mark Shields, Democrats Constituency-Coddling, CREATORS
SYNDICATE (Jan. 27, 2003), available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/0l1/27/
column.shields.opinion.shields. The controversy lies in the Court's rebuffing the supermajority
in Carhart.
197. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C.A. §
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that physicians render a service in exchange for monetary compensation.'98
While it is difficult to ascertain exactly how much money physicians earn for
performing abortions, Planned Parenthood's total revenues in 2003 of $766.6
million, with a profit of $36.6 million, exemplifies the immense amount of
money involved in just one segment of the abortion industry. 99
In addition, the economic activity that stems from abortions crosses state
lines. For example, Dr. Carhart traveled between Nebraska and Ohio to perform
abortions.2' As recently as 2003, the Court acknowledged that abortions impact
interstate commerce.2°' When arguing in a 1993 case that the Ku Klux Act
should apply to demonstrators in front of abortion clinics, Justice Stevens
commented on the substantial number of those seeking abortions who travel in
interstate commerce.'2 Consequently, abortions in general, and partial-birth
abortions specifically, impact interstate commerce.2 3
Thus, the PBABA should withstand any constitutional challenge based on the
preceding three assertions. Refusing to decide the unique constitutional issues
raised in the PBABA, and instead determining the case on one of the previously
mentioned tangential grounds, would amount to the Court skirting the role that
it assumed as the final federal and state authority on the constitutionality of
abortion law.2'
1531(a) (West Supp. 2004); 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 4.10 (West 3d ed. 1999) (stating that
"Congress' motive did not have to be commercial because the interstate commerce power was
plenary").
198. Simply because some abortions are executed at no monetary cost to the woman does
not diminish the overall economic nature of the abortion industry. Some opponents of the
PBABA may invoke comparisons to United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), in addition
to Morrison. However, there is no actual economic activity involved with the act of carrying
guns into schools. On the other hand, providing partial-birth abortions is an economic activity.
See supra note 181.
199. Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., 2002-2003 ANNUAL REPORT 18,
available athttp:llwww.plannedparenthood.orglaboutlPPFA-annreport03.pdf. Planned Parent-
hood also listed their clinic revenues at $288.2 million. Id. In addition, former Republican
counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Manuel Miranda, stated that abortion clinics make
an average profit of $1000 on every abortion they perform. Phyllis Schlafly, Ashcroft Stands
up to Abortion Industry, COPLEY NEWS SERv., Mar. 3, 2004.
200. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 958 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
201. See Scheidler v. NOW, Inc., 537 U.S. 393,408 (2003).
202. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 313 (1993) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
203. It is perhaps indicative of the weakness of the opposing argument that the only
discussion of it in the three district court cases striking down the PBABA was when one court
pointed out that the plaintiffs did not even make the argument. Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v.
Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 439 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
204. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
626 (Vol. 57:601
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol57/iss3/5
COMMENT
C. The First Look at the PBABA
All three federal district courts where challengers sought injunctions of the
PBABA completed their constitutional review of the legislation and issued their
decisions, and all three courts found the PBABA unconstitutional.2 5 The ruling
issued by Judge Phyllis Hamilton of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California provides the most useful point of analysis because it
unashamedly states the concepts and presuppositions underlying all three
decisions and wholeheartedly accepts all the arguments of the Act's
opposition °206 The court found that the Act was an undue burden on a woman's
right to seek an intact D&E before viability,20 7 was unconstitutionally vague,' 8
and lacked a health exception that was constitutionally required under the facts
and circumstances of the case.2°9
When discussing the district court's conclusions or analysis, the testimony of
the experts for each side and how their position affected the court's factual
findings becomes extremely important. The court found the plaintiffs experts
to be qualified to testify as experts and to be very credible witnesses.2 0 In
contrast, the court generally dismissed the testimony of the government's
witnesses for two interesting reasons. First, the court considered it damning that
the government's experts did not perform partial-birth abortions themselves.2 '
Second, the court considered the government's experts' objections to "entirely
legal and acceptable abortion procedures" as another disqualifying factor.212
205. See Nat'lAbortion Fed'n, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436; Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v.
Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805 (Neb.
2004).
206. The other two judges were more subdued. For example, Judge Richard Casey of the
Southern District of New York seemed to be the most reluctant to invalidate the ban. While
admitting that "D & X is a gruesome, brutal, barbaric, and uncivilized medical procedure," he
also felt that "Stenberg obligates this Court and Congress to defer .. " Nat'l Abortion Fed'n,
330 F. Supp. 2d at 479, 493. In addition, Judge Casey limited his holding to invalidating the
PBABA for lacking a health exception and did not make any "constitutional
rulings ... unnecessary to the resolution of the case." Id. at 482-83. In Carhart, Judge Richard
Kopf limited his injunction to those situations where the fetus was at least disputably not viable.
Carhart, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1003.
207. Planned Parenthood, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 974.
208. Id. at 978.
209. Id. at 1034.
210. Id. at 998.
211. Id. at 965-66,998-99; cf Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 1009-10,1024 (Neb.
2004). Judge Kopf displayed a similar bias toward experts who do not perform partial-birth
abortions, but in a less blatant manner.
212. Planned Parenthood, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 998. The court also doubted the credibility
of government witnesses for the mysterious reason that some had testified before Congress. Id.
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The court's tendency to accept the testimony of only one side as legitimate
obviously colors all of the resulting factual conclusions.1 3 In particular, the
Supreme Court should not take seriously the district court's conclusion that "the
majority of highly-qualified experts on the subject believe intact D & E to be the
safest, most appropriate procedure under certain circumstances."2"4 In the same
way that a court considering the constitutionality of a statute criminalizing
insider trading should not solely consider the testimony of those who had
performed the targeted conduct, the district court was wrong to dismiss
otherwise qualified experts because they did not perform partial-birth
abortions.215
In light of the district court's attitude toward the government's witnesses and
the case in general, it is not totally surprising that the court found Congress's
limited language as potentially encompassing not only all D&Es, but also
inductions and even the medical treatment of spontaneous miscarriages. 216 The
court came to its conclusion despite the Act's careful physiological definitions
and explicit scienter requirements to the contrary.2 17 The court went even
further, however, insisting that even if the Act only applied to partial-birth
abortion, it would create an undue burden because it applied to previability and
postviability abortions.218 Judge Hamilton claimed that the failure to distinguish
between previability and postviability abortions violated Roe and Casey.219 The
undue burden test, however, only applies to previability abortion regulation.22°
Therefore, a statute that does not distinguish between previability and
postviability procedures does not automatically fail, but merely suffers the
at 1019-20. Being invited to testify before Congress would seem like a qualifying instead of a
disqualifying factor.
213. Indeed, the court used the same reasoning to dismiss the factual findings of Congress.
Id. at 1025-26.
214. Id. at 1034.
215. One example of the absurdity of only accepting the opinion of those engaged in the
economic enterprise of partial-birth abortion is when the court stated that "all of the doctors who
actually perform intact D&Es concluded that in their opinion and clinical judgment, intact
D&Es remain the safest option for certain individual women ...." Id. at 1001 (emphasis
added). It seems obvious that these individuals would have a motive to provide such a
justification when they have already admitted engaging in the conduct. See also Carhart, 331
F. Supp. 2d at 1011 (stating "Congress arbitrarily... disregarded the views of doctors who had
significant and relevant experience with these procedures").
216. Planned Parenthood, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 975.
217. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C.A. § 153 1(a) (West Supp. 2004).
218. Planned Parenthood, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 975.
219. Id.
220. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992). "An undue burden exists, and
therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability." Id.
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application of the test. Despite appearances of federal court review of abortion
legislation to the contrary, the undue burden test does not automatically strike
down a statute as unconstitutional.22'
In analyzing the comparative health benefits of partial-birth abortion and
ultimately rebuffing Congress's conclusions on the issue, the district court
performed quite a slight of hand. The court began by considering that in 5-15%
of the D&E abortions performed, physicians are able to remove the fetus intact
up to its head and then perform a partial-birth abortion.222 The court seemed to
decide that this option somehow becomes compulsory upon physicians. The
court's decision treated the existence of the option to perform a partial-birth
abortion as transforming all D&E abortions into potential partial-birth
abortions.223
In equating D&E to partial-birth abortion, the court also appeared to
intentionally misconstrue the language of the statute. Judge Hamilton stated that
the statute could prohibit a physician from bringing part of the fetus, "[which]
is 'part of the fetal trunk past the navel,"' out of the woman during a D&E.21
In other words, the court implied that simply bringing an arm of the fetus outside
of the woman might fall under the prohibition. The PBABA clearly limits this
language, however, to a procedure involving delivery of a fetus in the breech
position, and would thus require the entire body up to the specified part on the
fetal trunk to be outside of the womb.225 This should not occur during a standard
D&E.
After clouding the statutory and practical distinctions between partial-birth
abortion and other abortion procedures, the district court easily found the statute
unconstitutionally vague.226 Most strikingly, the court concluded that the
PBABA could proscribe physicians from performing other abortions despite the
statutory requirement that the physician "knowingly performs a partial-birth
abortion. ' 227 Therefore, the court questionably treated partial-birth abortion as
221. After Casey, strict scrutiny no longer applies to abortion regulation. Id. at 876-77;
Colleen K. Connell, The Supreme Court's Recent Abortion Decisions: A Pro-Choice Critique,
in ABORTION AND THE STATES: POLITICAL CHANGE AND FUTURE REGULATION 13, 14 (Jane B.
Wishner ed., 1993).
222. Planned Parenthood, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 965. This option arises when the cervix dilates
more than usual. Id.
223. Id. at 965,977-78; see also Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 1018 (Neb. 2004)
(Judge Kopf making a finding of fact that "intact D&E or D&X (the banned procedure) is
merely a variant of the standard D&E").
224. Planned Parenthood, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 972 (quoting Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act
of 2003, 18 U.S.C.A. § 153 1(a) (West Supp. 2004)).
225. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531(a).
226. Planned Parenthood, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 974-78.
227. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531(a). While Judge Hamilton seemed to ignore the Act's intent
2004]
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a variant of a D&E, and considered the two as synonymous for purposes of
comparative health advantages."'
Whereas the district court's analysis should have exclusively compared the
supposed health advantages of partial-birth abortion over D&E and other
abortion types, the court oftentimes used the health advantages of the standard
type of D&E as its basis of comparison.229 Both sides have accepted that D&E
is the most common form of second-trimester abortion.23° For the court to infer,
however, that Congress or the government was referring to all D&E abortions
when it made its findings about the lack of health advantages reveals an apparent
bias against the PBABA.23' From the preceding seriously flawed premises, the
court proceeded to draw conclusions about the necessity of a health exception
in the PBABA.23z Hopefully, when the PBABA is challenged before the
Supreme Court, the Court will avoid the analytical pitfalls the district court
allowed itself to fall into, and reject its conclusion concerning the necessity of
a health exception.
requirements, Judge Kopf recognized that the PBABA would not apply "unless a physician
begins a particular abortion with a pre-meditated and specific intent to perform the abortion in
the manner the Act forbids," even if the physician ultimately makes a decision to take actions
resembling a partial-birth abortion because of circumstances arising during the procedure.
Carhart, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1033. His astute observation quickly loses its luster, however,
when he concludes that the fact that Dr. Carhart begins a procedure with the intent to perform
either a partial-birth abortion or a D&E impermissibly exposes him to criminal liability. Id. at
1034-37. Having this "dual intention" is just as nefarious as having the specific intent to
perform only a partial-birth abortion. Put another way, if the intent is criminal, it should not
matter how decisive the defendant was before taking the criminal action. If an individual
entered a home with the intent to either murder its occupants or merely harass them, that
individual would certainly have the requisite intent for premeditated murder should they
ultimately decide to murder the person.
228. Planned Parenthood, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 965-66,971-73,990-95,999-1000. Notably,
the district court's approach of equating D&E with partial-birth abortion certainly would have
voided any attempt by Congress to explicitly exempt D&E from the coverage of the statute.
229. Id. at 990-93, 999-1001. In this instance, Judge Kopf went even further than Judge
Hamilton by deciding to use the dangers of full-term childbirth as the baseline for comparing
health advantages. Carhart, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1018. This seems inappropriate considering
Congress's attempt to ban a single, rarely used method of abortion.
230. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 924 (2000) (finding that about 95% of second-
trimester abortions were D&E).
231. Planned Parenthood, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1000. "[S]tudies consistently show that D&E
is as safe or even significantly safer than induction, and both procedures are greatly safer than
either hysterotomy or hysterectomy .... Intact D&E is not a separate procedure, but rather,
simply a variant of the established D&E technique." Id.
232. Id. at 1000-01.
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IV. How the Supreme Court Should Decide National Abortion Federation v.
Ashcroft3
A. The PBABA Conforms with the Court's Abortion Jurisprudence, Including
Carhart
When the PBABA arrives before the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court will be
asked to make a determination on an issue remarkably similar to the one
addressed just a few years earlier in Carhart.2" Despite these similarities, the
Court should realize that Congress is not simply asking it to reconsider Carhart,
nor attempting to circumvent that decision. While Congress chose not to
directly adopt the framework recommended by some of the justices in the
Carhart majority, the Court should uphold the PBABA because it conforms with
the Court's abortion jurisprudence.235
For the valid reasons discussed previously, Congress chose neither to exempt
the D&E procedure by name, nor to limit the prohibition's coverage to
procedures falling under the term D&X.236 Nevertheless, the PBABA defines
the abortion procedure in sufficient detail to negate the Carhart argument that
the procedure could be confused with a standard D&E.237 Whereas the Carhart
majority argued that an arm or leg pulled out of a woman's womb while
performing a D&E could alone constitute a "substantial portion" of the fetus
under the Nebraska law, this type of D&E would never fall under the PBABA's
definition.23s The Act's language clearly limits its scope to procedures removing
either the entire fetal head or the entire lower half of the fetal body.239 Any
argument that a D&E could involve this much extraction would seem like a
disingenuous last-ditch effort to frustrate the legislation.'
Additionally, Congress carefully defined partial-birth abortion as a distinct,
overt act that kills a living fetus.24' In this respect, the PBABA provides two
forms of protection for physicians that wish to continue performing D&E
233. 330 F. Supp. 2d 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). This is one of the three district court cases
finding the PBABA unconstitutional and may be the case to which the Supreme Court grants
certiorari.
234. Planned Parenthood, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 957; Temporary Restraining Order, Carhart
v. Ashcroft, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1015 (D. Neb. 2003).
235. "A respect for stare decisis does not require the most expansive application of
principles enunciated in a prior decision." Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 975 F.2d 871, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc).
236. See supra Part HI.A.1.
237. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531 (a) (West Supp. 2004).
238. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 938-40 (2000).
239. 18 U.S.C.A. § 153 1(a).
240. Contra Women's Med. Prof I Corp. v. Taft, 353 F.3d 436, 451 (6th Cir. 2003).
241. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531(a).
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abortions: (1) the physician must perform an overt killing act besides the pulling
of the fetal body outside of the woman,242 and (2) the fetus must be alive when
the physician performs the act.243 The scienter requirements of the Act are an
additional aspect that prevent the prosecution of those performing D&E
abortions. For the PBABA to apply, the first intent requirement demands that
the physician "knowingly performs a partial-birth abortion." 2' The second
intent requirement states that the physician must "deliberately and intentionally"
commit the overt act that kills the partially delivered fetus.245
The Court should ignore the imaginative hypothesizing of the PBABA's
opponents who argue that police officers might haul innocent doctors - those
performing D&E abortions - off tojail. If physicians perform a procedure that
fits under Congress's careful definition and scienter requirements and still call
the procedure D&E, they can either choose to modify their procedure or bear the
risk of prosecution. .A policy of assumed risk seems particularly just if
physicians perform such a procedure with the knowledge that they are
performing a partial-birth abortion, and with the specific intent to commit the
overt lethal act.
246
The Court in Carhart adopted and reaffirmed the undue burden framework
used in Casey, although it focused its analysis on whether Nebraska's partial-
birth abortion legislation would impact the commonly used D&E procedure.247
Clearly, a D&E abortion performed within generally accepted guidelines would
not violate the PBABA. Therefore, because the PBABA regulates only one
procedure, which few physicians use for reasons unrelated to medical
necessity,24 and does not precipitate any substantial obstacle to a woman
making the ultimate choice to abort, the limitation cannot be considered an
undue burden under Casey or Carhart.2 9
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. The specific intent requirement seemingly would even allow physicians to use partial-
birth abortion methods if it became necessary during an abortion, as long as the doctors did not
intend to perform a partial-birth abortion when they began. Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp.
2d 805, 1033 (Neb. 2004).
247. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 938-46 (2000).
248. See, e.g., supra Parts II.B, III.A.2; infra Part IV.B; see also NewsHour, supra note 138
(Dr. Cook commenting that the PBABA "really just impacts a very small number of what I
would consider to be rogue physicians").
249. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877-78 (1992). "What is at stake is the
woman's right to make the ultimate decision .... Id. at 877. "An undue burden exists, and
therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability." Id. at 878.
Previability abortion regulation must satisfy the undue burden test, while strict scrutiny no
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Casey specifically stated "that a law which serves a valid purpose, one not
designed to strike at the right itself, has the incidental effect of making it more
difficult or more expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to
invalidate it. ' '250  In fact, a physician can avoid performing a partial-birth
abortion by ensuring that the fetus is dead before extracting the fetal body
otherwise in accordance with the partial-birth abortion procedure.2 1 A
physician can execute in utero fetal death by taking the additional step of
injection, severance of the umbilical cord or some other lethal act.252 Assuming
there are any valid concerns that weigh against performing a D&E in a particular
case, this additional step could resolve the concerns while also eliminating the
infanticide similarity of partial-birth abortion.
Even Dr. Carhart and Dr. Haskell admit that, while they prefer to use the
partial-birth abortion procedure in some circumstances, it never represents the
only safe alternative.253 The Court made it clear in Casey that, even with regard
to previability regulation, the liberty that it sought to protect was a woman's
ability to make the ultimate decision of whether to abort.254 Because safe and
easily obtainable alternatives to partial-birth abortion remain,255 the ban on
partial-birth abortion would not impact this ultimate decision. In her Carhart
concurrence, Justice O'Connor stated that, as long as a safe and adequate
abortion alternative remains, a prohibition on partial-birth abortion, even before
viability, will probably not constitute an undue burden.256 Even assuming that
longer applies to abortion regulation. Id. at 876-77; Connell, supra note 221, at 14.
250. Casey, 505 U.S. at 874.
251. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 995 (N.D. Cal.
2004); Bopp & Cook, supra note 27, at 51. The district court offered unconvincing arguments
against this simple solution. It stated that some patients simply prefer the fetus to be alive when
its brain is evacuated, and also mentioned minor health risks, such as those associated with any
injection. Planned Parenthood, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 995-96; see also Carhart, 331 F. Supp. 2d
at 1028 (asserting that it is actually impossible to kill the fetus in some situations before
extraction).
252. Cf. Carhart, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1027-28.
253. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-105, § 2(14)(D)-(E), 117 Stat.
1201, 1204; see Planned Parenthood, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1002 (agreeing that partial-birth
abortion is never the only option to preserve a woman's health).
254. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
255. The fact that a doctor has difficulty tearing apart fetuses inside a woman at this late
gestational stage does not constitute an undue burden on the woman. Haskell, supra note 15,
at 28; see also Bopp & Cook, supra note 27, at 56 ("[T]he partial-birth abortion procedure has
not been proven safer than other abortion methods, just more convenient for the physician.");
NewsHour, supra note 138 (Dr. Cook noting the lack of any "demonstration anywhere in any
medical literature or any expert's testimony that this procedure in any way enhances or protects
a woman's health versus any other procedure").
256. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 951 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice
O'Connor refers to the procedure as D&X rather than partial-birth abortion in her statement.
20041
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2004
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
a woman pursuing a late-term abortion may be marginally safer undergoing a
partial-birth abortion because of the fetal size and advanced tissue development,
the woman's decision to wait until this late point to obtain an abortion should
minimize her ability to put forth an undue burden argument.257 As previously
discussed, almost all partial-birth abortions currently performed are elective, so
invocations of emergency circumstances should not defeat the preceding
argument. 25 8 Thus, a limitation on partial-birth abortion creates only a slight
burden, if any, on a woman's ability to obtain abortions.
Therefore, the Supreme Court should uphold the PBABA because it does not
impose an undue burden on a woman's right to abort,2 9 and the partial-birth
abortion procedure is never "necessary, in appropriate medicaljudgment, for the
preservation of the... health of the mother. ''2' Despite strong evidence against
any necessity for a health exception, however, it seems that the Carhart standard
may still not allow for the absence of a health exception. Even in Carhart,
"medically sophisticated minds . . . searched and failed to identify a single
circumstance... in which partial birth abortion is required., 26' Therefore, while
the Court should plainly conclude that Congress's PBABA resolved the Carhart
issue of vagueness, the health exception dilemma still looms. If the Court
construes the health exception requirement in the same expansive way as it did
in Carhart and refuses to accept Congress's finding that an exception to the
PBABA is never required, these determinations could independently doom the
Act.
262
Id.
257. See RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION,
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 169 (1993) (stating that "a pregnant woman has
usually had ample opportunity to reflect upon and decide whether she believes it best and right
to continue her pregnancy or to terminate it").
258. See supra Part III.A.2.
259. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877-78 (considering the undue burden test and its application);
see also supra Part 1V.A (noting that the burden is not undue).
260. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-105, §2(14)(O), 117 Stat. 1201,
1206 (stating that "partial-birth abortion is never medically indicated to preserve the health of
the mother .. "); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973) (stating the health exception
requirement).
261. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 1020 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v.
Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436,480 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (stating that the plaintiffs could not point
to any "specific patient or actual circumstance in which D&X was necessary to protect a
woman's health").
262. Cf Nat'l Abortion Fed'n, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 439 n.1 (finding the PBABA
unconstitutional solely on the basis of the missing health exception).
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B. The Carhart Health Exception Requirement Should Be Read Narrowly
The PBABA can survive a reasonable application of the health exception
requirement stated in Carhart, whereas a broad reading of this precedent clearly
defeats the Act. Beyond insisting that any law prohibiting or regulating the
ability to obtain an abortion contain a health exception, Carhart held that the
legislation must also have a health exception when merely restricting a single
abortion procedure.263 The Carhart reading thus expands the requirement
beyond the Roe standard restated by the Court in Casey.2"
Part of the Casey opinion, joined by a majority of the Court, explained that
Roe's "essential holding" required a health exception if the woman "continuing
her pregnancy would constitute a threat to her health. ' 265 In other words, the
only concern of a health exception, if narrowly read, is that the woman can
safely terminate the pregnancy when necessary to preserve her health as opposed
to a concern over the safest method of termination. The Carhart majority
opinion, however, rejected this view and insisted that the health exception
requirement forced states to allow a woman to use the least risky method of
abortion.2" Nevertheless, the congressional findings of the PBABA meet this
expanded requirement by definitively determining that partial-birth abortion is
never the safest method of abortion.267
Beyond merely requiring a health exception when prohibiting a rarely used
procedure, Carhart also appears to have essentially flipped Roe and Casey's
health exception requirement on its head. Instead of requiring a state to include
a health exception when necessary, the Court demanded that Nebraska prove
that a health exception is never necessary. 26s The difference is slight on its face,
but extremely consequential in application. Requiring states to include a health
exception when necessary would give a modicum of deference to the
government, while still requiring it to show the lack of necessity for an
exception. The government could weigh the medical evidence and opinion,
determine that a health exception is not necessary, and meet the burden on its
face. In the extreme, the language in Roe could be interpreted as placing the
burden on the statute's challenger to show an absolute necessity for a health
263. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 930.
264. Id. at 921 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 879).
265. Casey, 505 U.S. at 880; Carhart, 530 U.S. at 1009 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
266. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 931.
267. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-105, § 2(5), 117 Stat. 1201, 1202.
268. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 937-38.
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exception.269 At the very least, under Casey, the determination of whether a
health exception is necessary could be objectively shown and determined.2 70
The requirement that a state show that a health exception is never necessary,
however, which was seemingly adopted by Carhart, demands far more.27'
Under an expansive reading of Carhart, the Court defers to the judgment of
individual physicians.272 Even though Carhart specifically rejected a need for
unanimity of medical opinion,273 this subjective requirement seems to demand
it.274 In fact, it is impossible to surmise another manner in which a state or the
federal government can prove that an exception is never required in the
judgment of the physician seeking to perform an abortion.275 In short, the net
rule places an insurmountable burden on the government to prove that no
physician in the jurisdiction would believe, in their "appropriate medical
judgment," that the target of the legislation would ever provide a better
alternative in regard to the broadly defined health of their patient.276 Justice
Kennedy believes that this unnecessary deference to doctors performing
abortions clearly indicates a return to the abortion-on-demand jurisprudence
embodied by Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,277 even
though Casey specifically rejected such decisions as insufficiently valuing state
interests by employing strict scrutiny."' Akron found an informed consent
requirement unconstitutional because of the inconvenience and interference it
imposed upon the physician.279 Carhart also seemed to defer to the needs and
269. Schmutz, supra note 149, at 556; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973).
270. Bopp & Cook, supra note 27, at 49. "In other words, the issue is whether taking into
account both the mother and the child's interests, the health of the mother is capable of being
preserved following the legislative ban, and not whether a particular means of abortion remains
available." Id.
271. See Carhart, 530 U.S. at 1009 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[U]nless a State can
conclusively establish that an abortion procedure is no safer than other procedures, the State
cannot regulate that procedure without including a health exception.").
272. Id. at 968 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
273. Id. at 937 ("Neither can that phrase require unanimity of opinion.").
274. Id. ("Nebraska has not convinced us that a health exception is never necessary.")
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
275. Id. at 937. "If a doctor could decide without regard to the statute whether he felt it was
necessary to perform the D&X procedure, it would make the statute meaningless." Gauthier,
supra note 170, at 662.
276. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992) (referencing the broad
definition of health being expressed in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973), and Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973)).
277. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
278. Casey, 505 U.S. at 870-72 (rejecting Akron and Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists as "inconsistent with Roe's statement that the State has a
legitimate interest in promoting the life or potential life of the unborn").
279. Akron, 462 U.S. at 442-45; see also Carhart, 530 U.S. at 968-69 (Kennedy, J.,
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concerns of the physician, who makes an economic profit on the practice, and
thus risked destroying any state ability to regulate abortion.280
Perhaps the Carhart Court did not seriously intend to require a state to show
that an exception is never necessary, despite the way in which it framed the
28statement. 81 The Court made two word choices when discussing the health
exception that give some hope for the PBABA's proponents. First, the Court
cited a "significant" body of medical opinion supporting the proposition that the
partial-birth abortion procedure is safer, as grounds for necessitating a health
exception.282 Second, the Court stated that Casey requires a health exception
when "substantial" medical authority suggests that eliminating the particular
abortion procedure could endanger a woman's health.283 Even the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California identified this substantial medical
authority requirement as the health exception holding of Carhart.? Although
under this interpretation the comparative health advantage still presents an
extension of Casey,285 legislators can objectively satisfy the burden. At a
minimum, the Court should clarify the health exception requirement stated in
Carhart to one that is only invoked when challengers of the legislation make an
objective showing of overall health benefits and a correlating need for an
exception. Clearly, an accurate legislative showing that the regulation never
requires a health exception would satisfy such a requirement.286
During extensive findings over the course of six years, Congress definitively
concluded that a ban on partial-birth abortion does not require a health
dissenting).
280. See Carhart, 530 U.S. at 968-69 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
281. See supra Part IV.B.
282. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 937.
283. Id. at 938.
284. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 978 (N.D. Cal.
2004); see also Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 1004 (Neb. 2004) (citing a
requirement for substantial medical authority as part of the core legal principle of Carhart);
Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing the
significant body of medical opinion language). One should keep in mind, however, that after
quoting the same "significant body of medical opinion" language, all three courts essentially
required unanimity of opinion regarding the lack of necessity for a health exception by pointing
to any disagreement on the question as grounds for requiring the exception. Carhart, 331 F.
Supp. 2d at 1008 (asking whether substantial evidence existed showing the banned procedure
is "never necessary"); Nat'l Abortion Fed'n, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 491-92 (explaining that the
standard is easy for the physicians to overcome); Planned Parenthood, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1009
(stating that Carhart held "that the existence of a division of medical opinion supported the
need for an exception").
285. See Carhart, 530 U.S. at 937-38; Bopp & Cook, supra note 27, at 49.
286. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2(4)-(5), 117 Stat.
1201, 1202.
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exception.287 In fact, Congress found no credible medical evidence, let alone
significant medical authority, that indicated partial-birth abortions were safer
than alternative procedures.2"' Even the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York found that many of the purported health advantages of
partial-birth abortion were merely "theoretical" and did not "rise above the
realm of hypothetical." 2 9
Furthermore, beyond the fact that a safe alternative to partial-birth abortion
always exists, evidence shows that physicians rarely use partial-birth abortions
for health reasons. 2' As one example, Dr. Haskell stated that 80% of the partial-
birth abortions he performed were purely elective.29' Furthermore, even in those
abortions performed for health reasons, the validity of that label is often
doubtful. For example, Dr. McMahon considered genetic deformities, along
287. Id. § 2(5), (14), 117 Stat. at 1202-06.
288. Id. § 2(14)(B), 117 Stat. at 1206.
289. Nat'l Abortion Fed'n, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 480. This court also emphasized that the
plaintiffs could not point "to a specific patient or actual circumstance in which D&X was
necessary to protect a woman's health." Id. It is revealing, however, that after making these
findings the court still thought the health exception requirement crafted in Carhart made the
PBABA unconstitutional. Id. at 480-81, 491-92.
290. See 149 CONG. REc. S3560 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 2003) (statement of Sen. DeWine);
Bopp & Cook, supra note 27, at 9. Many in the media quickly adopted and purveyed previous
suggestions by advocates of the legality of partial-birth abortion that the procedure is rare and
only used when medically necessary. See, e.g., M. Greg Bloche, When Science and Politics
Mix, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2003, at B5 (claiming that some physicians think the procedure is
medically necessary in rare circumstances); Douglas Johnson, Infants Are Being Killed, USA
TODAY, Oct. 23, 2003, at A14 (discussing a September 2003 Planned Parenthood press release
describing partial-birth abortion as an "emergency abortion" procedure); Jeremy Zremski, Legal
Battle Looms Over New Statute, BuFF. NEWS, Nov. 6, 2003, at A12 (claiming that partial-birth
abortions are rare and sometimes the only option to protect the woman's health); NewsHour,
supra note 138 (describing partial-birth abortion as "a rare and medically necessary operation").
Unfortunately, those claims are inaccurate. See, e.g., Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act § 2(4)-(5),
(13)-(14), 117 Stat. at 1202-06 (establishing through extensive congressional investigation that
partial-birth abortions are never medically necessary); Bopp & Cook, supra note 27, at 56
(noting that partial-birth abortion is not medically indicated); Johnson, supra note 289
(discrediting the Planned Parenthood claim that partial-birth abortion is an "emergency
abortion" procedure); NewsHour, supra note 138 (noting the lack of any demonstrated benefit
to women's health). Ron Fitzsimmons - who was then executive director of the National
Coalition of Abortion Providers - later admitted that his well-publicized assertions concerning
the rarity and necessity of partial-birth abortions were patently false. David Stout, An Abortion
Rights Advocate Says He Lied About Procedure, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 26, 1997, at A12; see also
Bopp & Cook, supra note 27, at 14 (discussing Fitzsimmons' repudiation and noting that 3000
to 5000 partial-birth abortions is a more accurate annual figure).
291. Bopp & Cook, supra note 27, at 9. The other 20% were for genetic reasons. Id.
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with "depression, minor maternal complication, and even a small pelvis as
separate 'health' indications to kill the baby in advanced gestation.,
29 2
To summarize the foregoing crucial points, partial-birth abortions are not
normally performed for health reasons, nor are they ever necessary to protect a
woman's health. Additionally, prior abortion decisions provided Congress with
reasonable concern that the courts would expansively require an included health
exception in such a manner as to obstruct appropriate enforcement of the ban.293
Therefore, based on congressional findings and the facts surrounding partial-
birth abortions, the Court should uphold the PBABA as validly omitting a health
exception under this narrower and more reasonable reading of Carhart.
C. The PBABA Advances Important and Legitimate Interests
The PBABA advances important and legitimate interests, thus providing
another reason why it should survive a constitutional challenge. While the
Carhart holding did not explicitly depend on an assertion of insufficient state
interests, such a determination underlies the Court's reasoning.29 In fact, the
majority opinion asserted that the "interest-related differences" did not matter
in regard to the question at hand.295 The Court's dismissal of Nebraska's
interests as illegitimate seemed to contribute to the Court's dismissive view
toward the State's findings regarding the lack of necessity for a health exception
and toward the State's attempt to define the procedure that it wished to
prohibit.296  If the Court applies the previability undue burden test to the
PBABA, the validity of the state interests will become directly relevant.297
The Court in Casey clearly implied that the state interest in previability fetal
life is significantly less than in postviability fetal life.298 In fact, states may
regulate abortion so as to create an undue burden on the right to choose an
abortion, as long as that regulation only impacts postviability abortion.29 The
majority in Carhart concluded that the Nebraska partial-birth abortion ban
would apply both before and after viability, posing a difficult constitutional
292. Id. at 11.
293. See supra Part I.A.2.
294. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930-31 (2000).
295. Id. at931.
296. See supra Parts II.D.1, H.D.2.
297. "The fact that a law which serves a valid purpose, one not designed to strike at the right
itself, has the incidental effect of making it more difficult.., to procure an abortion cannot be
enough to invalidate it." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (emphasis
added).
298. Id. at 846.
299. "An undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or
effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the
fetus attains viability." Id. at 878 (emphasis added).
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question in light of Casey.3" In prejudicial fashion, Justice O'Connor simply
referred to the statute as "Nebraska's ban of previability partial-birth
abortions,""'' thus invoking the undue burden standard. Although the language
of the PBABA does not limit its application to postviability procedures,3"
partial-birth abortion was designed for later term procedures when the fetus is
more likely viable.303 The previously discussed views of Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg, however, reject any state interest in regulating partial-birth abortion
regardless of fetal viability.3 4
While the Justices in the Carhart majority seemingly could not perceive
legitimate interests advanced by these state legislative bodies, Justice Thomas
and Congress each pointed to the concern of "permitting a procedure that
resembles infanticide and threatens to dehumanize the fetus. 30 5 An expert that
testified before Congress and the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California explained the ethical objection "to any situation where the act that
killed the fetus occurred outside of the body of the mother, '' 306 thus lacking the
foundational constitutional justification of the woman's bodily integrity. Even
the majority opinion in Carhart admitted that one goal of prohibiting partial-
birth abortion was to preserve the integrity of the medical profession 30 7 - an
interest the Court had recognized in at least one prior Supreme Court opinion." 8
The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme Court also found a legitimate
relationship between an interest in prenatal life and the other interests that the
Nebraska legislature attempted to advance.309 The Association of American
300. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 930.
301. Id. at 948 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
302. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C.A. § 153 1(a) (West Supp. 2004).
303. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 924-29; Haskell, supra note 15, at 28. Dr. Haskell generally
performs the partial-birth abortion procedure between twenty and twenty-four weeks gestational
age, and sometimes up to twenty-six weeks. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 987 n.6 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). Dr. Haskell also noted in his lecture that physicians can suitably use the procedure,
with some other refinements, up to thirty-two weeks gestational age or more. Haskell, supra
note 15, at 33. Congress found that, according to the AMA, the procedure is generally
performed at twenty weeks or later. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-
105, § 2(14)(1), 117 Stat. 1201. While a precise definition for viability does not exist, infants
have a substantial chance for survival outside the womb at twenty-three weeks - a chance that
increases to over 70% by twenty-six weeks. Bopp & Cook, supra note 27, at 22-23.
304. See supra Part II.D.3.
305. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 1002, 1007 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Partial-Birth Abortion Ban
Act § 2(14)(G), 117 Stat. at 1205.
306. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 1026 (N.D. Cal.
2004).
307. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 931.
308. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 748-50 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring).
309. Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Taft, 353 F.3d 436, 443 (6th Cir. 2003); Carhart, 530
U.S. at 931. Nevertheless, it seems the Court might have implicitly dismissed these state
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Physicians and Surgeons and the AMA wrote amicus briefs for the Carhart
Court in support of Nebraska's position."' They did this precisely because they
felt that there was an ethical distinction between killing a fetus inside the womb
and killing one mostly outside of the womb.3 ' Justice Kennedy also recognized
the moral significance of the distinction and felt that the "Court's refusal to
recognize Nebraska's right to declare a moral difference between the [D&E and
partial-birth abortion procedures] is a dispiriting disclosure of the illogic and
illegitimacy of the Court's approach to the entire case. 31 2
The interests explicitly advanced by the PBABA resemble those advanced by
the Nebraska law struck down in Carhart: (1) drawing a bright line between
abortion and infanticide; (2) preserving the integrity of the medical profession;
and (3) preventing brutality toward a partially born infant.31 3 Nevertheless, the
Court should not automatically dismiss these interests as illegitimate for several
reasons. First, the PBABA expounds on Congress's interests and the underlying
rationale behind those interests in convincing detail.314 More importantly, at
least according to the Court in Roe and Casey, the PBABA specifically seeks to
advance the health interests of women who desire to obtain abortions.3 5 In Roe,
the Court established a rule that seemed to only allow states to further an interest
in health with regard to any second-trimester abortion regulation. 6 In Casey,
the Court acknowledged that a state always possesses an interest in furthering
the health and safety of women seeking abortions.3"7 Finally, in Carhart, the
Court reaffirmed a state's interest in promoting women' s health.31 8 The PBABA
advances an interest in health by protecting women from the grievous health
risks associated with partial-birth abortions, including the ultimate risk of
death.319 Furthermore, the PBABA also points out that partial-birth abortions
possess no health advantages over alternative, available abortion procedures.320
interests. See Carhart, 530 U.S. at 930-3 1.
310. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 963 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
311. Id.
312. Id. at 962 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
313. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2(14)(A)-(O), 117 Stat.
1201, 1204-06; Carhart, 530 U.S. at 930-31.
314. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act § 2(14)(A)-(O), 117 Stat. at 1204-06.
315. Id. § 2(14)(F), 117 Stat. at 1205.
316. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973). But see id. at 150 ("In assessing the
State's interest, recognition may be given to the less rigid claim that as long as at least potential
life is involved, the State may assert interests beyond the protection of the pregnant woman
alone.").
317. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992).
318. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 931.
319. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act § 2(14)(A), 117 Stat. at 1204.
320. Id. § 2(14)(B)-(E), 117 Stat. at 1204-05.
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Abortion advocates like Ronald Dworkin incorrectly argue that the interests
opposing abortion in general are "essentially religious" values and are, thus,
illegitimate.321 First, while many religious people value fetal life and place great
value on all life, this ethos crosses into many secular sectors of American society
and other societies as well.322 Second, even if legislators based the interests in
protecting the sanctity of life on religious values, religious values often underlie
legislation3 23 and such interests do not become illegitimate merely because the
regulation impacts a constitutional right.324 The presence of religious
underpinnings may ultimately win the day for those who oppose the legislation,
but it should not disqualify the interest per se.325
321. DWORKIN, supra note 256, at 155-56.
322. Dworkin's implication that only religious people believe life has inherent value is
ridiculous, based on any concrete definition of religion. Clearly, nonreligious people place
inherent value on life, as all secular societies prohibit some form of murder. Additionally,
Dworkin contradicts his assertion that the interest in opposing abortion is a religious or
illegitimate one, instead labeling the interest as "the legitimate interest in maintaining a moral
environment in which decisions about life and death are taken seriously and treated as matters
of moral gravity." Id. at 168.
323. The Ten Commandments and the Levitical law were among the earliest examples of
codified law. Additionally, these religious laws laid the foundation for the laws of many
subsequent civilizations. While religious values provide the stimulus for many laws, or
historically underlie society's view of appropriate conduct, legislators often point to valid
secular purposes instead. There are some examples, however, of explicit invocation of religious
values by legislators. See, e.g., 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2000) (adding "under God" to the pledge of
allegiance); 10 U.S.C. § 502 (2000) (ending the Armed Forces enlistment oath like many other
statutory oaths with "So help me God"); 10 U.S.C. § 802 (placing "I will trust in my God" in
the Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces); 36 U.S.C. § 119 (2000) (giving the
President the authority to set aside a national day of prayer); 36 U.S.C. § 302 (declaring the
national motto as "In God we trust").
324. DWORKIN, supra note 256, at 149 (saying that American political practice assumes it
may protect intrinsic values); Michael J. Perry, The Religious Voice in the Public Square:
Religious Arguments in Public Political Debate, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1421, 1425 (1996)
("Moreover, to disfavor religious arguments relative to secular ones would be to violate the core
meaning - the antidiscrimination meaning - of the free exercise norm."); Michael
Scaperlanda, Who Is My Neighbor?: An Essay on Immigrants, Welfare Reform, and the
Constitution, 29 CONN. L. REv. 1587, 1615-21 (1997) (arguing against godless politics).
325. Contra Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003). "The issue is whether the
majority may use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole society through
operation of the criminal law. 'Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our
own moral code."' Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)). Of
course the very issue in this case would be, as it was in Lawrence, the Court substituting its own
moral code for the people's, without a clear constitutional mandate to do so.
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Thus, PBABA advances important and legitimate interests.326 According to
Justice Kennedy, the Court held in Casey that the judiciary need not, and in fact
should not, provide an exclusive list of interests that states may invoke when
legislating abortion.3 27 In fact, contrary to the sentiment implied by the Justices
in the Carhart majority, Casey seems to validate any interest whose purpose is
not to diminish the constitutional right to an abortion.3 28 Therefore, when
examining the PBABA, the Court should give credence to its precedent and the
valid interests Congress has expressed. In the words of the Sixth Circuit, "these
important and legitimate interests warrant[] a measure of deference, rather than
the virtual assumption of unconstitutionality that has led federal courts... to
invalidate the efforts of at least 20 states to exercise their limited sovereign
authority to regulate abortions and abortion methods. ' ' 329 Unlike the Carhart
approach, once the Supreme Court recognizes the importance of the
governmental interests in regulating partial-birth abortion, it can appropriately
review and uphold the PBABA.
D. If Necessary, the Court Should Ignore the Holdings of Carhart That Seem
to Weigh Against Upholding the PBABA
Acknowledging the similarity of the PBABA to the Nebraska law in Carhart
naturally leads to a discussion of how the Court should deal with precedent in
the abortion context. Casey focused heavily on the importance of precedent. On
such a politically divisive issue, the Court reasoned that any reversal of its
previous case law would give the appearance of capitulation and threaten the
institution's legitimacy.33 In this sense, Casey established an unusually high
threshold for overruling Roe because Roe was a watershed decision and was
intended to resolve an intensely divisive issue.33' Roe's significance, however,
326. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2(14)(A)-(O), 117 Stat.
1201, 1204-06 (drawing a bright line between abortion and infanticide, preserving the integrity
of the medical profession, preventing brutality toward a partially born infant, and benefiting
women's health overall).
327. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 961 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
328. Casey, 505 U.S. at 874,877; see Carhart, 530 U.S. at 930-31; Carhart, 530 U.S. at 946
(Stevens, J., concurring).
329. Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Taft, 353 F.3d 436, 444 (6th Cir. 2003).
330. Casey, 505 U.S. at 867 ("[O]nly the most convincing justification under accepted
standards of precedent could suffice to demonstrate that a later decision overruling the first was
anything but a surrender to political pressure, and an unjustified repudiation of the principle on
which the Court staked its authority in the first instance.").
331. Id. at 866-67; see also Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416,420 n.1
(1983); cf. Akron, 462 U.S. at 452-75 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The issue was intensely
divisive, and many would argue that Roe did not come close to adequately resolving the
controversy. "Roe fanned into life an issue that has inflamed our national politics in
general .... By keeping us in the abortion-umpiring business, it is the perpetuation of that
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should not provide a shield around all other Supreme Court decisions regarding
abortion and should certainly not give the Court justification to so grossly
expand its abortion precedent as it did in Carhart.332
The Casey plurality's argument for bestowing Roe with higher precedential
authority only pertained to Roe's central holdings and principles.333 Even in
Casey, for example, the Court rejected a portion of Roe by eliminating its
trimester framework after determining that Roe contradicted its own framework
and required its abandonment.334 Casey also expressly ignored the holdings of
some intervening abortion cases.335 The Court chose to value the precedent of
Roe over the later abortion cases.336 In a similar manner to those intervening
cases, Carhart surpassed the tenets that Roe and Casey established, and actually
contradicted them. 337 If the trimester framework created by Roe failed to "fulfill
Roe's own promise that the State has an interest in protecting fetal life or
potential life," the Court explicitly rejecting the state's express interests in
potential life, coupled with the Court protecting a procedure so similar to
infanticide, fails to fulfill Roe to an even greater extent.338
Roe's author, Justice Blackmun, established a fairly high standard for
overruling a prior holding. After acknowledging the importance of stare decisis,
he found that the Court can properly overrule a prior case when it "has bred
confusion or been a derelict or led to anomalous results."339 While this comment
has already argued that the PBABA should withstand an application of Carhart,
one could also argue that Carhart should be read broadly to invalidate the Act.
If read this broadly, however, Carhart qualifies for overruling under Justice
Blackmun's standard. A broad reading of Carhart is derelict and breeds
confusion on the issue of whether states' interests will truly be allocated any
weight in constitutionality determinations regarding abortion legislation.
Additionally, the strict scrutiny flavor of the Carhart opinion directly
contradicts Casey, which rejected strict scrutiny in favor of the undue burden
test forpreviability abortion regulation and deferential treatment of postviability
disruption... that the Court's new majority decrees." Casey, 505 U.S. at 995-96 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
332. "Mere precedent is a dangerous source of authority, and should not be regarded as
[singly] deciding questions of constitutional power .... ABRAHAM LINcOLN, SPEECHES &
WRrriNGs 394 (1959).
333. Casey, 505 U.S. at 872.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 872; see, e.g., Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 768-69 (1986); Akron, 462 U.S. 416.
336. Casey, 505 U.S. at 871 (choosing "to rely upon Roe, as against the later cases").
337. See supra Part IV.
338. Casey, 505 U.S. at 876.
339. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579 (1991).
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regulation.3 ° While the Carhart Court made no mention of compelling interests
or narrowly tailored means, its unforgiving statutory interpretation and
expansive requirement for a health exception is strictly fatal in fact.34 ' The
above aspects of Carhart defy the determination first announced in Roe and
more strongly restated in Casey that states have important interests that limit the
constitutional right to obtain an abortion. 42 Invalidating the PBABA would be
a derelict and anomalous result, which is out of step with Roe and Casey. Any
part of Carhart that seems to demand such a derelict result deserves overruling.
Therefore, in areas where Roe and Carhart conflict, the Court should rely, as it
did in Casey, on Roe's central holding instead of Carhart's errant reasoning.
The PBABA presents additional reasons for the Court to ignore the expansive
and errant reasoning of Carhart. One compelling reason that Congress's ban on
partial-birth abortions must withstand judicial review lies in the fact that a
human being can only accurately be called partially born at the point when the
doctor pierces its skull.343 In addition to the falsity of the conclusion that the
PBABA targets previability abortions, some scholars argue that this claim
becomes irrelevant in light of the reality of the procedure.344 In general, the
partial-birth abortion procedure involves the removal of the partially born infant
to the point where only the head remains within the womb. 45 Partially born may
seem like an odd distinction, but referring to this human being as being unborn
is unrealistic.' The infant is mostly out of the womb and, therefore, more born
at this point than not.
For those who may object to the partially born label as semantic gymnastics,
Roe is to thank for essentially drawing a magical personhood line at a woman's
cervix. 7 Despite the Court's rhetoric, it could not have decided Roe without
making some determination regarding the beginning of at least personhood, if
not life.348  The Supreme Court definitively chose birth as the line for
personhood.3 9 While ironically arguing for constitutional protection of the
340. Casey, 505 U.S. at 872 (rejecting strict scrutiny); id. at 878 (explaining the undue
burden test and its application after viability).
341. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (characterizing "conventional
strict scrutiny" as "fatal in fact"); see also supra Parts II.D. 1, lI.D.2.
342. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
343. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2(14)(H), 117 Stat.
1201, 1205 ("Thus, the government has a heightened interest in protecting the life of the
partially-born child.").
344. Bopp & Cook, supra note 27, at 26-30.
345. Id. at 26; see Haskell, supra note 15, at 30.
346. Bopp & Cook, supra note 27, at 26.
347. Id. at 26-30; see, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 157.
348. "We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins." Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
349. Bopp & Cook, supra note 27, at 45.
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partial-birth abortion procedure, even Judge Posner acknowledged that "the line
between feticide and infanticide is birth" and went so far as saying that "no
possible concern for the mother's life or health justifies killing the baby" after
it emerges from the womb.35° By ignoring the constitutional status of the
partially born infant, the Court seriously undermined the legitimacy of its
abortion precedent.35" ' Despite the precedent of Carhart, the Court should not
make the same mistake when analyzing the PBABA, but should instead respect
the definition of personhood it established in Roe.352 Therefore, when a living
human being has mostly crossed the personhood line, the Court must give some
constitutional recognition to this fact to maintain any consistency and legitimacy
on the issue. 3
E. The Court Should Not Interfere with the People's Right to Ban Partial-
Birth Abortion
While the Supreme Court's jurisprudence references the competing interests
in fundamental rights issues as the state or governmental interests, the Court
could perhaps better understand the competing interests in terms of the people
who compose these governing bodies.3' 4 Democracy relies on the premise that
people have the ability and the right to govern themselves.355 The Supreme
Court seems to have forgotten that legislative bodies and the laws that they pass
are not just rivals that the Court must slay in its chivalrous defense of
fundamental liberties.356 In fact, legislative bodies, though they often fail in the
endeavor, are designed to represent the interests, ethics, and morality of their
constituency.357
350. Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 882 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J., dissenting).
351. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914,920-46 (2000). Justice Scalia asserted that the Court
has an "inclination to bend the rules when any effort to limit abortion, or even to speak in
opposition to abortion, is at issue." Id. at 954 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
352. Roe, 410 U.S. at 157.
353. See Bopp & Cook, supra note 27, at 45.
354. "The civic body [the politeuma, or body of persons established in power by the polity]
is everywhere the sovereign of the state; in fact the civic body is the polity (or constitution)
itself." ARISTOTLE, THE PoLITIcs OF ARISTOTLE 110 (Ernest Barker trans., Oxford University
Press 1958).
355. "In democratic states, for example, the people [or demos] is sovereign: in oligarchies,
on the other hand, the few [or oligoi] have that position ... ." Id. at 110.
356. See also Michael A. Scaperlanda, Replies to Professor Chemerinsky: The Undiluted
Values of Justices Versus the Justice of Undiluted Values, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 17, 41 (2001)
("[T]he framers attempted to temper majority rule, but they also attempted to destroy the
possibility of minority rule.").
357. See, e.g., Scaperlanda, supra note 324, at 1615-21.
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For example, the Court's denial of a state or the federal government's ability
to prohibit slavery would certainly be an injustice.358 Beyond the gross injustice
to the enslaved, judicial usurpation would also prevent citizens from enforcing
their moral disgust of slavery, forcing them to tolerate its ugly presence all
around them. 359 In fact, in a situation where society would not recognize the
enslaved population as persons entitled to life and liberty under the Constitution,
the slavery opponents could only put forth arguments based on their moral
opposition to the slaveholders choosing to enslave others."W The opposition
would insist that the forced continuance of slavery would place a burden of
condemnation on the society as a whole.36" ' The only just solution seems to be
for courts to allow laws embodying this moral opposition to withstand judicial
review.
Regulation of partial-birth abortion presents the Court with a dilemma unique
from other legislative attempts to regulate abortion. The issue is unique because,
although the nation remains closely divided on whether some right to an
358. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 257, at 123, 128 ("[I]t is a precondition of legitimate
democracy that government is required to treat individual citizens as equals, and to respect their
fundamental liberties and dignity .... Taken at face value, [the Bill of Rights] command[s]
nothing less than that government treat everyone... with equal concern and respect .... ).
359. Slavery provides a very useful comparison for this topic. Immediately before the Civil
War, there was an intense division over the issue, ultimately boiling down to stark differences
of moral opinion regarding the value and worth of a slave's life. The Missouri Compromise
sought to limit the evil of slavery if it could not actually abolish it. The Court struck down that
compromise in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), relying on a substantive
due process right to property that could not yield in any way to the interests of a democracy.
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITCAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 28-31
(1990).
360. "The child in the womb, under the Supreme Court Roe v. Wade decision, is
property .... It is the same case. It is Dred Scott, and for some reason we just choose not to
see it." 149 CONG. REC. 53560, S3606 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 2003) (statement of Sen. Santorum);
see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 998 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(recognizing the common substantive due process underpinnings). "Roe and the decisions
reaffirming it are equal in their audacity and abuse of judicial office to Dred Scott .... Just as
Dred Scott forced a southern pro-slavery position on the nation, Roe is nothing more than the
Supreme Court's imposition on us of the morality of the elites." ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING
TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE 173-74 (1996).
361. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTEs ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 174-75 (J.W. Randolph
1853) (1787). President Jefferson stated:
And can the liberties of a nation be thought secure when we have removed their
only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the people that these liberties are of
the gift of God? That they are not to be violated but with his wrath? Indeed I
tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just; that his justice cannot sleep
forever ....
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abortion exists, a supermajority of Americans favor banning partial-birth
abortion.362 To be exact, a Gallup poll found that 70% of Americans support
banning the procedure except when necessary to preserve the life of the
woman.363 Because the Court is the only branch powerless to enforce its
determinations, it relies on its legitimacy and support, both popular and
intergovernmental.36 In practical terms, when recognizing a fundamental right
clearly not contained in the text of the Constitution," the Court can only reject
the views of a certain number of Americans before it loses all the legitimacy and
support crucial to its very existence.
In addition to the overwhelming number of people opposed to partial-birth
abortion, Carhart recognized that "[m]illions of Americans believe that life
begins at conception and consequently that an abortion is akin to causing the
death of an innocent child .... ."" After also stating the pro-choice position
fearing a ban on abortion, the Carhart majority made the somewhat surprising
assertion that it took into account both of these "irreconcilable" points of
view.367 Those on the Court who support an expansive application of the
principles underlying the Carhart decision have come to two conclusions fatal
to the ideals of the previously referenced "millions of Americans." First, they
have determined that the viewpoints of those who place great value on fetal life
and those who desire to have a right to abort fetal life are irreconcilable.368
Second, they have concluded that only the interest in having an abortion is
protected by the Constitution, and that it therefore subordinates all competing
values.369
362. See, e.g., NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll (Nov. 8-10, 2003), at http://www.
pollingreport.com/abortion.htm (noting that 53% favored the broad right to abortion, while 44%
always opposed abortion or wanted it legal only in cases of rape, incest, or when the woman's
life is in danger); CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll (Oct. 24-26,2003), at http://www.pollingreport.
com/abortion.htm (stating that the nation is divided equally, with 44% pro-life and 44% pro-
choice).
363. "By an overwhelming margin of 70 percent to 25 percent, according to this week's
Gallup Poll, voters favor making it illegal to perform a specific procedure 'in the last six months
of pregnancy known as partial birth abortion, except to save the life of the mother."' Shields,
supra note 196.
364. See THE FEDERAUST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
365. Obviously the Constitution does not mention abortion or privacy. The "right to
privacy," invoked in Roe v. Wade as protecting abortion, was recognized by the Court in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), as residing in the penumbra, or shadow, of
several constitutional amendments.
366. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 920 (2000).
367. Id. at 921.
368. Id.
369. Id.
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Ever since Roe, these "millions of Americans" have felt "despair[] that their
government, at its highest level, sanctioned what they took to be the destruction
of human life at its most vulnerable stage. '370 In light of this debate, the Court
stated in Roe, "[W]e do not agree that, by adopting one theory of life, [a state]
may override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake."371
The expansive abortion jurisprudence that threatens the PBABA gives the
impression that the Court has now adopted its own theory of life: whatever may
be in the womb is legally and morally insignificant until the point that its mother
or a physician deems it to be significant.37 2 In this vein, the Court's decision to
protect partial-birth abortion, in its Carhart decision, extended the mother' s and
physician's quasi-divine prerogative even beyond the womb.373 No other
explanationjustifies nullifying states' interests in protecting the life of a partially
born human being.
The mistake that the Court has made regarding abortion is that, while
recognizing a constitutional right to privacy that encompasses abortion,374 it has
failed to give constitutional weight to the countervailing interests. These
interests include the states' interest in providing for community morality, which
is an interest arguably embodied in the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution.375
States should retain the ability to distinguish between the morality of destroying
a life inside the womb from the morality of destroying a life being delivered
from the womb.376
The right to life presents another countervailing interest with constitutional
weight. Justice Blackmun concluded in Roe that if "personhood is established,
the appellant's case, of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to life would then
be guaranteed specifically by the [Fourteenth] Amendment." '377 President
Ronald Reagan contended, "[U]ntil someone can prove the unborn human is not
370. JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAN, DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL 27 (1995).
371. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
372. See Carhart, 530 U.S. at 930-31, 946 (Stevens, J., concurring); Hodges, supra note
157, at 180. Again, the physician is deciding whether to sell his partial-birth abortion services
and, thus, is not the most neutral party.
373. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 946 (Stevens, J., concurring) (concluding that Nebraska may not
prohibit partial-birth abortion).
374. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 ("This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action... [or] in the Ninth
Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.").
375. Of course the Tenth Amendment could not be construed to provide the federal
government any interest or right, but the argument does go to discredit the holding of Carhart.
376. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 962 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
377. Roe, 410 U.S. at 156-57.
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alive ... it should be entitled to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." '378
Although Roe clearly stated that a life inside of the womb is not a person,379 the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution provide
constitutional reinforcement to the federal government and states' interest in
preserving the sanctity of life.38 Admittedly, these interests are not expressly
tied to the Constitution, at least with regard to a private actor taking the life of
a human being that the Court does not define as a person.38' Of course, neither
is any right to abortion found in the text of the Constitution. Furthermore, the
Justices need not even look to the penumbra of the Constitution to identify the
constitutional governmental interests in regulating abortion.382 The foundation
for these countervailing interests, at least, appears in the actual text of the
constitutional amendments.383
While this comment does not propose that the abortion issue should boil
down to a battle of which interests are more constitutional, the government's
interests in regulating abortion are certainly significant, if not actually
compelling, and deserve proper consideration."' Instead of raising their
figurative hands in surrender and concluding that the pro-choice and pro-life
points of view are irreconcilable, the Court should at least make an honest
attempt to achieve a compromise.385
378. PETER HANNAFORD, THE QUOTABLE RONALD REAGAN 22 (1998).
379. Roe, 410 U.S. at 158 ("[T]he word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment,
does not include the unborn.").
380. Hodges, supra note 157, at 183.
381. One constitutional scholar pointed out that "the Court's assertion is false. The
Fourteenth Amendment does not guarantee a right to life - it guarantees only that life cannot
be taken by the state without due process of law." STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF
DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIvIALIzE REuGIOUs DEVOTION 252 (1993).
While the claim may not be as strong as that stated in Roe, the Constitution's recognition of the
value of life should still carry legal clout. Roe, 410 U.S. at 156-57.
382. The Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), discovered the "right to
privacy" in the penumbra, or shadow, of several constitutional amendments. This same right
to privacy was found to be broad enough to encompass a woman's right to abort an unborn life.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
383. See U.S. CONST. amends. X, XIV.
384. Supreme Court precedent does not concretely define compelling interests. Recently,
however, in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), the Court concluded that "student body
diversity is a compelling state interest." Id. at 325. Under this standard, the preservation of life,
adult women's health, and the morality of the community all seem to be sufficiently compelling
interests.
385. Long before Carhart, the federal courts clearly showed their hand regarding how they
valued the competing interests of pro-life and pro-choice groups. "Abortion litigation in district
courts is a lopsided affair .... [C]ivil-rights groups prevailed in 87 percent of the cases they
were involved in, and Planned Parenthood... prevailed in 82.4 percent of their cases. The pro-
life groups... prevail[ed] in only 46 percent ...... BARBARA M. YARNOLD, ABORTION
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Roe established the basic premise that "the State does have an important and
legitimate interest in preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant
woman ... [and] it has still another important and legitimate interest in
protecting the potentiality of human life."3" 6 Casey seemed to promise that
future decisions would give true weight to these interests.387 In fact, seven
Justices in Casey "acknowledged that States have a legitimate role in regulating
abortion and recognized the States' interest in respecting fetal life at all stages
of development."388  An application of Carhart that would invalidate the
PBABA, however, seems to render these promises pure rhetoric.389
In his Carhart dissent, Justice Scalia explained his disbelief "that this Court,
armed with neither constitutional text nor accepted tradition, can resolve [the]
contention and controversy [surrounding abortion] rather than be consumed by
it."3" Regardless of the validity of his argument, the Court will not likely
overturn Roe in such a manner that abortion will no longer receive constitutional
protection. 39  The PBABA, however, certainly does not contradict Roe, but
rather achieves a balanced compromise that is democratically uncontroversial
POLITICS IN THE FEDERALCOURTS 116 (1995). The bias against the pro-life position continues
in the federal courts. In March 2004, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
determined that the government's request for redacted medical records concerning partial-birth
abortions was an undue burden, partly because the medical information had a limited probative
value. See Northwestern Mem'l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2004). This is a
somewhat surprising conclusion considering that a focal issue of the PBABA-Carhart
controversy focuses on the health advantages of partial-birth abortion. Moreover, in 2004, the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California also exemplified this bias in numerous
ways, such as blatantly disregarding the government's witnesses. See Planned Parenthood
Fed'n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 967-68 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
386. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
387. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) ("[T]he State has legitimate
interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of
the fetus that may become a child.").
388. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 981 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
389. Id. at 983.
390. Id. at 956 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Hodges, supra note 157, at 187 ("[T]he Court
should return the abortion decision to the democratic process, and not try to settle this difficult
question for all fifty states.").
391. Based on the composition of the majority in Casey and Carhart, at least six of the
current justices favor upholding Roe v. Wade in some manner. With certain Senators' current
litmus test forjudicial appointments, and their extreme use of filibustering in enforcing that test,
it is also doubtful that the Court will become any more pro-life. "Abortion has become a sacred
cause for the Court, before which neither the Constitution nor the Court's previous decisions
can stand. The abortion right has survived many changes in the Court's personnel
and ... abortion virtually on demand and for any reason seems secure for the foreseeable
future." ROBERT H. BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES 73 (2003).
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and should be constitutionally uncontroversial.392 To retain its legitimacy, the
Court must honor its promise in Casey and balance the interests on both sides
of the abortion debate in a manner that attempts to respect both sides' positions
instead of clearly capitulating to the pro-choice 393 movement.3" A balanced and
reasonable judicial review of the PBABA will surely result in its validation.
To allow for a true balancing of the important and legitimate interests on both
sides of the abortion debate, the Court must withdraw from an expansive
understanding of the health exception requirement. The health exception should
not be an amorphous and expansive requirement that serves to nullify any
supposed ability to regulate abortion.395 By interpreting the health exception
narrowly, as recommended above,396 and resuscitating Casey's acknowledgment
of governmental interests,397 the Court can return some balance and legitimacy
to its role in the abortion debate.
Some skeptics of the balancing of interests in reviewing abortion legislation
have posed two concerns, which warrant discussion. First, some have argued
that such balance will open the "floodgates of litigation."3 98 Holdings that either
reject Carhart's formulation of the health exception or find the PBABA proper
under Carhart could indeed invite more legislation attempting to regulate
abortion and corresponding litigation challenging it. As undesirable as these
results may be, the Court wholeheartedly opened this Pandora's box with its
decision in Roe.3" Essentially, the Court has three options regarding abortion:
392. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, The War Over Abortion Moves to a Smaller Stage, N.Y.
TiMES, Oct. 26, 2003, § 4, at 4 ("[Tlhe new ban represents, not a watershed, but a kind of
equilibrium, a resting place in the 30-year national conflict over Roe."); see also Shields, supra
note 196.
393. While terms ranging from anti-choice to pro-killing are sometimes used, this comment
refers to the respective positions concerning the desirability of legalized abortion by their
respectively preferred names, the pro-choice and pro-life movements. ANN COULTER, SLANDER:
LIBERAL LIES ABOUT THE AMERICAN RIGHT 198 (2002); NAT'L ABORTION & REPROD. RIGHTS
ACTION LEAGUE, WHO DECIDES?: A STATE-BY-STATE REvIEW OF ABORTION AND REPRODUC-
TIVE RIGHTS (10th ed. 2001); Family Research Council Symposium, The Pro-Life Movement
at Thirty: A Political Assessment 19-20 (Jan. 16, 2003), available at http://www.frc.org/get.
cfm?i=PD03601.
394. See Schmutz, supra note 149, at 529, 546 ("[T]he Supreme Court of the United States
entered the abortion battleground and rendered an opinion which left the pro-life movement
wounded and the pro-choice movement victorious.").
395. See supra Part II.A.2.
396. See supra Part IV.B.
397. See supra Part IV.C.
398. Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 608 (1976).
399. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 174 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice
Rehnquist drew parallels to Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and its progeny:
As in ... cases applying substantive due process standards to economic and social
welfare legislation, the adoption of the compelling state interest standard will
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(1) to take Justice Scalia's suggested approach and defer to the legislative
bodies;' (2) to determine "that the woman's right [to abortion] is absolute and
that she is entitled to terminate her pregnancy at whatever time, in whatever
way, and for whatever reason she alone chooses" ;401 or (3) to recognize abortion
as a constitutional right immersed in a divisive controversy with important and
valid interests on both sides of the debate. The first two options would certainly
decrease the opportunities for legislation or litigation. The Court, however, has
repeatedly rejected the first option,4°2 and the second is clearly invalid, unjust,
and contrary to both the Court's precedent 43 and the desires of an overwhelming
majority of this country. 404 Therefore, regardless of the litigious results, the
inevitably require this Court to examine the legislative policies and pass on the
wisdom of these policies in the very process of deciding whether a particular state
interest put forward may or may not be "compelling."
Roe, 410 U.S. at 174. Justice Scalia has also commented on political pressures facing the court:
How upsetting it is, that so many of our citizens... think that we Justices should
properly take into account their views, as though we were engaged not in
ascertaining an objective law but in determining some kind of social consensus.
The Court would profit, I think, from giving less attention to the fact of this
distressing phenomenon, and more attention to the cause of it. That cause
permeates today's opinion: a new mode of constitutional adjudication that relies
not upon text and traditional practice to determine the law, but upon what the
Court calls "reasoned judgment," . . . which turns out to be nothing but
philosophical predilection and moral intuition.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 999-1000 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
400. Casey, 505 U.S. at 1002 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("We should get out of this area, where
we have no right to be, and where we do neither ourselves nor the country any good by
remaining.").
401. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. "[I]n these extreme democracies, each man lives as he likes ....
This is a mean conception of liberty. To live by the rule of the constitution ought not be
regarded as slavery, but rather as salvation." ARISTOTLE, supra note 354, at 234.
402. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 946 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring). "The rhetoric
is almost, but not quite, loud enough to obscure the quiet fact that during the past 27 years, the
central holding of Roe v. Wade... has been endorsed by all but 4 of the 17 Justices who have
addressed the issue." Id.
403. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 887 (noting that not even the broadest reading of Roe
supports abortion on demand); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473 (1977) (asserting that Roe did
not declare an unqualified right to an abortion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) ("[T]he
right... is not absolute and is subject to some limitations."); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 189
(1973) ("[A] pregnant woman does not have an absolute constitutional right to an abortion on
her demand.").
404. See, e.g., Susan B. Anthony List, Why This Matters? (2003), at http://www.sba-
list.org/index.cfm/section/about/page/whythis.html ("Only 24% of Americans support abortion
on demand without any restrictions .... ") (citing a January 2003 CNN Poll on American
Attitudes on Abortion).
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Court must consider the governmental interests promised by its precedent and
demanded by justice.
Second, critics have also argued that a balanced regulation of certain abortion
procedures is inappropriate because no other medical procedure bears statutory
restrictions similar to those placed on abortion.' 5 Instead, most medical
decisions vest solely with patients in consultation with their physicians.406 Even
in Doe, Justice Blackmun compared abortions to other "voluntary medical or
surgical procedure[s]" and seemed confused why Georgia would have a
different requirement for one procedure over the other.4°7 It is unreasonable,
however, to equate abortion with mere medical procedures. Such reasoning
reveals an overwhelming blindness to the countervailing interests in the abortion
debate. No other medical procedure terminates the existence of something that
would otherwise - barring any unusual occurrence - leave its mother's womb
as a person endowed with the same rights as its mother and all other persons in
the United States.
V. Conclusion
The scales of justice can only adequately resolve the divisive controversy
over abortion if the Supreme Court recognizes the weighty interests on both
sides of the debate and gives more than lip service to the countervailing
government interests.408 Ideally, the Court should find that the PBABA passes
constitutional muster under Carhart.4  Congress clearly (1) defined the
prohibited procedure so as to avoid imposing an undue burden on the
constitutional right to abort, (2) based its prohibition on legitimate and important
interests, and (3) adequately justified its decision not to include a health
exception.41° In the alternative, Carhart's broad explication of the health
exception requirement should be read narrowly and in accordance with the
405. See NewsHour, supra note 138 (Dr. Paula Hillard characterizing the PBABA as placing
"the government between a woman and her physician"); see also Planned Parenthood Fed'n of
Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 1015 (N.D. Cal. 2004) ("Dr. Robinson reiterated his
belief that Congress should not legislate how doctors practice medicine."); cf MILBAUER &
OBRENTZ, supra note 101, at 122 (questioning why physicians have such a primary role in the
abortion decision-making process).
406. Contra NewsHour, supra note 138 (quoting Dr. Cook as noting that "government is
involved in medical decision-making in many ways" and that "when you talk about defending
somebody against as heinous a crime as partial birth abortion," the government must become
involved).
407. Doe, 410 U.S. at 199.
408. See YARNOLD, supra note 385, at 117 ("In the abortion cases examined overall, the
federal courts were not 'friends' of pro-life litigants.").
409. See supra Part IV.A.
410. See supra Parts III.A, IV.C.
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Court's previous abortion precedent such as Casey.4 ' An overly broad health
exception requirement constitutes the primary obstacle to a legitimate balancing
of the partial-birth abortion issue."a 2 Ultimately, providing constitutional
protection to partial-birth abortions would reveal a deep inconsistency with
Roe's definition of personhood, while also frustrating the overwhelming
consensus of this nation to oppose the procedure.4 13 The PBABA does not
violate the Constitution in any sense.4t4 Therefore, the Court should allow
Americans the ability to prevent partial-birth abortion.4t 5
Scott A. Hodges
411. See supra Part IV.B.
412. See supra Part III.A.2.
413. See supra Part IV.D.
414. See supra Part IV.A.
415. The Court should not again provide legal protection to a "gruesome, brutal, barbaric,
and uncivilized medical procedure." Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436,
480 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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